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ABSTRACT
Trademarks have ancient origins, and a long developmental history that has informed and shaped
modern approaches to trademark disputes. Many of these disputes are familiar. Yet others are a
product of technological developments, such as the threats modern trademark owners face as a
result of young and vibrant domain names. The United States Congress and the Internet
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recommendations for the government of Taiwan to adopt similar approaches to address domain
name disputes and cybersquatting.
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THE TRADEMARK/DOMAIN NAME PROTECTION WAR: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
U.S., UDRP AND TAIWANESE LAW
CHIH-HONG (HENRY) TSAI*
INTRODUCTION
Trademarks have a long developmental history, beginning with ancient origins
and eventually arriving at modern trademark law. Humans have historically used
marks to designate ownership, either as property owners or as manufacturers. 1
Primitive humans likely used marks to indicate the ownership of livestock. 2 One of
the earliest known trademark laws is the Bakers Marking Law of 1266 in England,
which governed the use of stamps or pinpricks on loaves of bread. 3 The English case
of Southern v. How in 1584 is considered by some to be the first case of actual
trademark infringement.4 There, the manufacturer of high-quality clothes reportedly
sued a competitor for producing lower-quality clothes while using a marking reserved
for top-quality clothing.5
Almost four centuries later, in July 1946, President Truman signed the Lanham
Act into law, establishing federal trademark protection in the United States.6 Since
then, there have been several amendments to the Lanham Act, 7 the most recent
being the “Trademark Technical and Conforming Amendment Act of 2010” that
became effective on March 17, 2010.8
In contrast, domain names are a product of internet technology and have a very
short history of about two decades. The domain name was developed in the 1980s
© Chih-Hong (Henry) Tsai 2013. Judge at the Taiwan Shi-lin District Court. Judge Tsai
earned his L.L.M. with honors in Intellectual Property Law from The John Marshall Law School
(2010) and is currently a Ph.D candidate at the Institute of Technology Law at the National
ChiaoTung University (Taiwan). He expresses his sincerest gratitude and appreciation to Professor
Arthur Yuan and the RIPL editorial staff for their assistance with this Article.
1 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:1
(4th ed. 2012).
2 Id.
3 Kenneth R. Pierce, The Trademark Revision Act: Origins of the Use Requirement and an
Overview of the New Federal Trademark Law, 64 FLA. B.J. 35, 37 (1990).
4 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5.2.
But see Mark P. McKenna, The Normative
Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1851 (2007) (calling into doubt the
report of Southern v. How). The earliest verified claim involving a trademark is the case of
Blanchard v. Hill, (1782) 26 Eng. Rep. 629 (Ch.); 2 Atk. 484. Id. at 1852.
5 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:2.
6 Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141
(2012)); Ann Bartow, When Bias is Bipartisan: Teaching About the Democratic Process in an
Intellectual Property Law Republic, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 715, 728 (2008) (recounting enactment of
the Lanham Act).
7 E.g., Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-113, Appendix I, §§ 3001–10, 113 Stat. 1501A-521, 1501A-545 to -552 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Title III is known as the “Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act.” Id. § 3001, 113 Stat. at 1501A-545.
8 Trademark Technical and Conforming Amendment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-146, 124
Stat. 66 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
*
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when the Internet was still primarily a North American research network that was
“run by a tight-knit group of specialists for use within their research and industrial
communities.” 9 Due to the availability of internet access, advances in internet
technology, and increases in online commercial activity, domain names have
gradually transformed the business society and our daily lives.
Trademark owners have the right to stop others from using their marks,10 which
are often names; domain names, technically and factually, use names exclusively in
cyberspace. When the well-established framework for trademarks clashes with the
young, dynamic domain name, then, a protection war between trademarks and
domain names ensues: which one has priority rights to a name? Should the
trademark owner have priority because he has a legally protected exclusive right?
Or should the domain name owner prevail because cyberspace is outside of
trademark territory? With the increase in economic and social value of domain
names, such conflicts become even more drastic. The Uniform Domain-Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) was created to resolve such disputes.11
This Article studies and compares the policies of the United States, the UDRP,
and Taiwan on these issues. Based on this study and comparison, it was found that
judging the trademark/domain name protection war is not clear-cut, but rather
entails a multi-factor balancing process. This Article recommends that Taiwan enact
its own anticybersquatting law in order to address cybersquatting through the
aforementioned balancing process.
Part I of this Article first explains what a domain name is from the view of its
appearance, function and management. Because there is no existing law that
directly protects domain names, Part II discusses the legal basis of domain names.
Parts III, IV, and V review trademark and domain name protections in the United
States, UDRP, and Taiwan, respectively, with each part covering the legal devices
available to trademark owners against the domain name registrant, and vice versa.
In addition to covering the respective laws, these parts also explain the practice and
application of each law. Part VI compares those legal practices. Finally, this Article
advances recommendations for the amendment of Taiwanese law in the area of
trademarks and domain names.

9 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SIGNPOSTS IN CYBERSPACE: THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM AND
INTERNET NAVIGATION 29–30 (2005) [hereinafter NAS], available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog
.php?record_id=11258.
10 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) (protecting against “false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact” that are likely to
cause confusion as to the source or affiliation of a good).
11 See Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 624 (4th
Cir. 2003.
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I. WHAT IS A DOMAIN NAME?
A. Its Appearance
A domain name consists of, at a minimum, a top-level domain and a second level
domain, and was historically a string of alphanumeric text.12 Due to development of
the Internationalized Domain Name (“IDN”),13 however, domain names are no longer
limited to alphanumeric text. 14 A domain name can now consist of characters in
languages such as Arabic, Chinese, or other scripts that do not use Latin letters.15
But the general format remains the same: there is a “dot” or period that delineates
the two domains. 16 For example, trademark.com is a domain name, wherein
“trademark” is the second level domain, and “com” is the top-level domain, separated
by the “dot” or period. There are two kinds of top-level domains: generic top-level
domains and country-code top-level domains.17 Before the new expansion of generic
top-level domains on January 12, 2012, 18 there were only twenty-two top-level
domain names available.19 After the expansion, the number of country-code top-level
domains increased to around 280.20
B. Its Function
Domain names function as interpreters between users and computers, devices,
and content on the Internet. 21 For computing devices, a name server processes
domain names into a set of 32- or 128-bit numbers, called an Internet Protocol
address (“IP address”), which is the address recognizable by computers or computing
devices, and used to identify locations on the Internet.22 The system of addresses and
names linked by name servers is called the Domain Name System (“DNS”), which
“establishes the signposts in cyberspace and serves as the basic infrastructure
supporting navigation across the Internet.”23

See Thomas v. Network Solutions, Inc., 176 F.3d 500, 503 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Internationalized Domain Names, INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & NUMBERS
[hereinafter ICANN], http://www.icann.org/en/resources/idn (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
14 Id.
15 IDN Glossary, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/en/resources/idn/glossary (last visited Mar. 3,
2013).
16 See Network Solutions, 176 F.3d at 503.
17 Brett R. Harris, Internet Update: Milestone Changes to the Domain System, N.J. LAW. MAG.,
Dec. 2008, at 69, 70.
18 Reveal Day 13 June 2012–New gTLD Applied-For Strings, ICANN,
https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/program-status/application-results/strings-1200utc-13jun12-en (last
visited Mar. 3, 2013).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 NAS, supra note 9, at 24.
22 Id. at 19.
23 Id. at 20.
12
13
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C. Its Management
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) is the
governing body responsible for DNS registration. 24 Under its framework, each
generic top-level domain has its own registry.25 Those who register a domain name
are considered a registrant.26 Domain names are not registered through the registry,
but rather through the service of the registrar.27 Thus, there is a contract between
the registrant and the registrar for the service of domain name registration and
use. 28 As for the country-code top-level domain (“CC-TLD”), it is assigned to the
manager of that country for operation.29 Each proprietor of a CC-TLD can establish
its own policy and framework for domain management under that CC-TLD.30

II. THE LEGAL BASES FOR DOMAIN NAMES
A. Three Theories for the Legal Basis
Unlike a trademark, a domain name is not directly protected by existing law.
Thus, it is vital to first explore the legal basis or posture of the domain name before
discussing disputes therewith. There are three theories for the legal basis of domain
names. The first theory was expressed in Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro
International, Inc., where the court viewed the domain name as a contractual right.31
This approach is straightforward because the registrant obtains the right to hold and
24 Aaron W. Brooks, The Cautious Interplay Between Trademarks and Internet Domain Names,
88 ILL. B.J. 74, 79 (2000).
25 See Registry Listing, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/resources/registries/listing (last
visited Mar, 3, 2013); Information for Registrars and Registrants, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/
en/resources/registrars (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
26 Registrant Rights and Responsibilities Under the 2009 Registrar Accreditation Agreement,
ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/resources/registrars/registrant-rights-responsibilities (last visited
Mar. 3, 2013) (stating that “[i]n order to register a domain name, a Registered Name Holder (also
known as a Registrant) has to use the services of an ICANN-accredited Registrar.”). An ICANNaccredited registrar is one who has entered into an agreement with ICANN to act as a registrar for
TLDs. See Statement of Registrar Accreditation Policy, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/en/resources/
registrars/accreditation/policy-statement (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
27 See Registrant Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 26.
28 Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 623–24 (4th
Cir. 2003); see also Become a Registrar, VERISIGN, http://www.verisigninc.com/en_US/products-andservices/domain-name-services/become-registrar/index.xhtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) (describing
the domain name registration process). VeriSign is the ICANN registry for “.com” TLDs. Id.
29 Resources for Country Code Managers, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/resources/cctlds
(last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
30 See VeriSign, Inc. v. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Nos., CV 04-1292(CTX), 2004
WL 1945561, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2004) (acknowledging that ccTLD registries are not regulated
by ICANN and are free to create policies for registrars and registrants).
31 Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc. 529 S.E.2d 80, 81 (Va. 2000).
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use the domain name under its registration contract with the registrar.32 The Umbro
court rested its reasoning on the fact that domain names do not exist separate and
apart from the registry’s function of making domain names into operational Internet
addresses.33
The second theory, found in the famous sex.com case of Kremen v. Cohen, treats
the domain name as intangible property. 34 Under the contractual right theory
discussed above, the registrant would have no rights to a domain name if he or she
lost the registration against his or her will. Finding this to be incorrect, the Kremen
court, therefore, looked to property law to define a registrant’s rights. The court held
that a domain name qualified as intangible property, which satisfied the predicate
requirement for a conversion action under California law. 35 The court began its
analysis by stating that “[p]roperty is a broad concept that includes ‘every intangible
benefit and prerogative susceptible of possession or disposition.’” 36 To determine
whether or not a property interest existed, the court looked to whether there was “an
interest capable of precise definition[,] . . . capable of exclusive possession or control,”
and whether “the putative owner [could establish] a legitimate claim to exclusivity.”37
The court found that:
Domain names satisfy each criterion. Like a share of corporate stock or a
plot of land, a domain name is a well-defined interest. Someone who
registers a domain name decides where on the Internet those who invoke
that particular name—whether by typing it into their web browsers, by
following a hyperlink, or by other means—are sent. Ownership is exclusive
in that the registrant alone makes that decision. Moreover, like other forms
of property, domain names are valued, bought and sold, often for millions of
dollars, and they are now even subject to in rem jurisdiction.
Finally, registrants have a legitimate claim to exclusivity. Registering
a domain name is like staking a claim to a plot of land at the title office. It
informs others that the domain name is the registrant’s and no one else’s.
Many registrants also invest substantial time and money to develop and
promote websites that depend on their domain names. Ensuring that they
reap the benefits of their investments reduces uncertainty and thus
encourages investment in the first place, promoting the growth of the
Internet overall.38
While the Kremen court found domain names were protected under a theory of
intangible property protection, what if the underlying claim had required tangible

Id. at 86.
Id.
34 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2003).
35 Id. at 1036.
36 Id. at 1030.
37 Id.
38 Id. (citations omitted).
32
33
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property?39 This leads to the third theory for the legal status of domain names—the
tangible property theory. The United States Bankruptcy Court in Utah, applying
Utah law, found that a domain name was tangible property for the purposes of a
conversion action.40
[L]ike web pages and software, domain names can be perceived by the
senses and access to them can be physically restricted by the use of
passwords and other security measures. . . . Moreover, unlike a mere idea
that can only be stored in a person’s mind, domain names can and do have a
physical presence on a computer drive. Accordingly, the Court concludes
that like web pages and software, the Domain Name at issue is a type of
tangible property that is capable of conversion.41
Some commentators have found this analogy between a website and a domain
name to be misleading because they serve different purposes and functions. Just as a
call number in a library catalog is not a book itself, a domain name is not a website,
but merely a means to locate a website. 42 The Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (“ACPA”) allows for in rem civil actions,43 which seems to support this
tangible property theory,44 which in turn supports the public policy argument that
“treating domain names as tangible property would allow for consistent application of
laws among the several States.”45
B. Legal Implications for Conflicts Between Domain Names and Trademarks
The property theories, whether intangible or tangible, appear to protect the
domain name registrant more favorably against conversion.46 This is not the case,
however, when a domain name encroaches upon a trademark. Traditional property
principles generally provide that ownership vests with the first person to exercise
dominion over property. 47 For domain names, this principle does not apply: A
39 See Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Techs., LLC, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1287 (D. Utah 2009).
(holding that Utah law would likely not recognize a conversion claim for intangible property). Utah
follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which “limits conversion actions involving intangible
property to intangible property that is ‘customarily merged in a document.’” Id. (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242(2) (1965)).
40 In re Paige, 413 B.R. 882, 918 (Bankr. D. Utah 2009).
41 Id.
42 Daniel Hancock, You Can Have It, But Can You Hold It?:
Treating Domain Names as
Tangible Property, 99 KY. L.J. 185, 200–02 (2010).
43 Title III of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-113, Appendix I, § 3002(a), 113 Stat. 1501A-521, 1501A-545 to -548 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012)).
44 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2).
45 Hancock, supra note 42, at 203.
46 See, e.g., Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that domain names,
though intangible property, may be the basis for a conversion claim).
47 See State v. Weekly, 65 N.E.2d 856, 857 (Ohio 1946) (providing definition of “owner” as “the
person in whom is vested the ownership, dominion, or title of property”) (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1311 (3d ed. 1933); see also Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 854 A.2d 928, 932 (N.J.
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domain name registrant cannot rely upon a “first come, first served” defense against
trademark owners. 48 Domain name registrants who find themselves in a conflict
with registered trademark owners have no inherent legal rights to assert.49 Aside
from other rights that might be asserted, such as free speech arguments under the
First Amendment, 50 the domain name registrant’s best argument may rely on
trademark law itself. That is, if the law does not provide trademark owners with a
mechanism through which they can request the return of a domain name from its
registrant, the registrant will be entitled to retain the domain name.
The
relationship between a domain name and a trademark is like that of a ship and an
island: A ship can only sail where there is no island; whenever a ship encounters an
island, it is the ship that must change course.51 With this observation in mind, this
Article will focus on U.S., UDRP, and Taiwanese laws to see how they balance the
interests of domain name registrants with trademark owners in the
trademark/domain name protection war.
III. TRADEMARK/DOMAIN NAME PROTECTION UNDER U.S. LAW
A. Weapons to Defend Trademarks Against Domain Names
Under current U.S. law, there are three possible weapons a trademark owner
might use to fight a domain name registrant: (1) remedies under the Lanham Act, 52
(2) injunctive relief under the Federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA”),53
and (3) the ACPA.54 Each weapon is discussed in the following passage, respectivley.

Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (defining “owner” as “the ‘person who had dominion of a thing, real or
personal, corporeal or incorporeal, which he has a right to enjoy and do with as he pleases.’”) (citing
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1259 (4th ed. 1968).
48 See Cardservice Int‘l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 740 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff‘d without
opinion, 129 F.3d 1258 (4th Cir. 1997). The court rejected the defendant domain name registrant’s
defense that because defendant reserved his domain name with Network Solutions, he was legally
entitled to use it, even if it infringed prior trademark rights. Id. The court stated that “[i]f
trademark laws apply to domain names, anyone who obtains a domain name under Network
Solutions’ ‘first-come-first-served’ policy must do so subject to whatever liability is provided for by
federal law.” Id.; Wash. Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Auths., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 n.3
(E.D. Va. 1999), aff‘d 217 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that “registration [as a domain name] in
no way trumps federal trademark law; registration of a mark or name with NSI does not itself
confer any federal trademark rights on the registrant.”).
49 See Brooks, supra note 24, at 79.
50 See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 48 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting defendant’s argument
that his for-profit use of a domain name consisting of a confusingly similar misspelling of a
cartoonist’s domain name was protected under the First Amendment as a form of protest).
51 Credit for this analogy should be given to Dr. Kung-Chung Liu during his lecture for the
Intellectual Property Professional Judge Training Program (2011–12).
52 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1116–18, 1125 (2012) (providing for injunctive and monetary
relief pursuant to traditional theories of liability for trademark infringement).
53 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
54 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
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1. Trademark Infringement Remedies Under the Lanham Act
Section 32 of the Lanham Act provides that any person shall be liable for
trademark infringement if, without authorization from the trademark registrant,
they
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to
be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive.55
Furthermore, section 43 of the Lanham Act provides remedies to trademark
owners who are, or believe they are, likely to be damaged by false designations made
by
(a)(1) any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.56
2. Equitable Relief Under the TDRA
The TDRA provides injunctive relief to

55
56

15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
Id. § 1125(a)(b).
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(c)(1) . . . the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or
through acquired distinctiveness . . . against another person who, at any
time after the owner‘s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark
or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or
dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic
injury.57
The TDRA also
circumstances.58

provides trademark infringement remedies under

certain

3. Battling Cybersquatters
The ACPA was enacted to curb cybersquatting, 59 which is the “practice of
registering well-known brand names as Internet domain names in order to force the
rightful owners of the marks to pay for the right to engage in electronic commerce
under their own brand name.”60 The ACPA states that:
(d)(1)(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark,
including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this
section, 61 if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that
person—

57

Id. § 1125(c)(1) (2012). Prior to the TDRA revision in 2006, subsection (c)(1) read:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity
and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against
another person‘s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such
use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in
this subsection.

Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 140-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985, 985.
58 Id. § 1125(c)(5) (providing remedies for “willfully intend[ing] to trade on the recognition of
the famous mark” or for “willfully intend[ing] to harm the reputation of the famous mark”).
59 S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 5 (1999).
The purpose of the [Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act] is to protect
consumers and American businesses, to promote the growth of online commerce,
and to provide clarity in the law for trademark owners by prohibiting the badfaith and abusive registration of distinctive marks as Internet domain names with
the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with such marks—a practice
commonly referred to as “cybersquatting.”
Id.

60 Justin T. Toth, Fighting Back on the Internet: A Primer on the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act, 14 UTAH B.J. 18, 19 (2001).
61 See Carl v. Bernardjcarl.com, 662 F. Supp. 2d 487, 497 (E.D. Va. 2009) (finding that
“personal names are not per se protected as matter of course” and that “a personal name used as a
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(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal
name which is protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that—
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar
to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar
to or dilutive of that mark;
(III) or [the symbol of the Red Cross] [a]s protected by reason of
section 706 of Title 18 or [the symbols and trademarks of the
Olympics as protected by] section 220506 of Title 36.62
The ACPA provides for an equitable remedy in that “a court may order the
forfeiture or cancellation of [a] domain name or the transfer of [a] domain name to
the owner of the mark.”63 A plaintiff bringing an ACPA claim may also “elect, at any
time before final judgment is rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead of actual
damages and profits, an award of statutory damages in the amount of not less than
$1,000 and not more than $100,000 per domain name, as the court considers just.”64
4. Applying the Weapons
a. Use in Commerce
Both a trademark infringement and a dilution claim require “use in
commerce,”65 which is defined in the Lanham Act to mean “the bona fide use of a
mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a
mark.”66 A mark is deemed to be “used in commerce” in connection with goods
(1) . . . when—

registered domain name must have acquired a secondary meaning at the time of registration”);
Ficker v. Tuohy, 305 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572 (D. Md. 2004) (expressing doubt as to whether “the ACPA
provides coverage for personal names that are not trademarked”).
62 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2012).
63 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(C).
64 Id. § 1117(d).
65 Jennifer Golinveaux, What’s in a Domain Name: Is “Cybersquatting” Trademark Dilution?,
33 U.S.F. L. REV. 641, 658 (1999).
66 15 U.S.C. § 1127.

[12:350 2013] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

362

(a) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the
displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or
if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on
documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of
services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are
rendered in more than one State or in the United States and a foreign
country and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in
connection with the services.67
The Lanham Act goes on to define commerce to mean “all commerce which may
lawfully be regulated by Congress.” 68 Thus, the statutory construction of “use in
commerce” has two layers of meaning: The first “use in commerce” is the commercial
use of a mark, whether it is the use of the mark on goods or on services; and the
second “use in commerce” must be a use of the mark that is within congressional
regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause.69
Although trademark infringement and dilution claims both require “use in
commerce,” there is no such requirement for a cyberpiracy claim under the ACPA.70
Both commercial and noncommercial uses may be subject to the ACPA.71 Rather
than requiring “use in commerce,” the ACPA requires a showing of “bad faith intent
to profit” from a mark, which can be achieved by registering, trafficking in, or using
another’s mark.72 Before the ACPA was enacted, at least one court found that merely
using the Internet in connection with a domain name was sufficient to the find the
use “in commerce,” and thus subject to Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act.73
After the ACPA was enacted, some courts took the view that dilution claims
were no longer applicable in the fight against cybersquatting. The Fourth Circuit
remarked: “We may and do conclude that the enactment of the ACPA eliminated any
need to force trademark-dilution law beyond its traditional bounds in order to fill a
past hole, now otherwise plugged, in the protection of trademark rights.”74 But the
ACPA does not entirely supersede trademark infringement and dilution claims
against Internet domain names. In Passport Health, Inc. v. Travel Med, Inc., the
evidence showed that the defendant’s use of the domain name,
Id.
Id.
69 United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir.
1997) (“The history and text of the Lanham Act show that ‘use in commerce’ reflects Congress‘s
intent to legislate to the limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause, rather than to limit the
Lanham Act to profit-seeking uses of a trademark.”).
70 Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2005).
71 See id. (“Allowing a cybersquatter to register [a] domain name with a bad faith intent to
profit but get around the law by making noncommercial use of the mark would run counter to the
purpose of the [ACPA].”).
72 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2012).
73 Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239–40 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
74 Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.Net, 302 F.3d 248, 261 (4th Cir. 2002).
67
68
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“www.passporthealthnca.com,” caused a likelihood of confusion among prospective or
actual customers, but there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
defendant acted in bad faith with intent to profit.75 This case demonstrates that
there are circumstances where trademark infringement and dilution claims are still
applicable against a domain name registrant, even though the ACPA is more directly
aimed at cybersquatters.
b. Likelihood of Confusion
Likelihood of confusion is the key element of a trademark infringement claim.76
Courts look to a number of factors when determining whether a given use of a mark
is likely to cause confusion with a prior mark. In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad
Electronics Corp,77 for example, the Second Circuit evaluated:
(1) the strength of the mark;
(2) the degree of similarity between the two marks;
(3) the proximity of the products;
(4) the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap,
(5) actual confusion,
(6) the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark,
(7) the quality of defendant‘s product; and
(8) the sophistication of the buyers.78
The other Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals utilize similar tests. 79 Another
more complete list for the “likelihood of confusion” test can be found in In re E. I.
DuPont DeNemours & Co.80 The factors set forth in that case are:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression;
75 Passport Health v. Travel Med, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01753-GEB-JFM, 2011 WL 590723, at *4–5
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011).
76 Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 193 (5th Cir. 1998).
77 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
78 Id. at 495.
79 E.g., Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1989) (listing eight factors);
Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 293 (3rd Cir. 1991) (listing ten factors);
Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1185 (7th Cir. 1989) (listing seven factors);
Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1984) (listing seven factors).
80 In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as
described in an application or registration or in connection with which a
prior mark is in use;
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade
channels;
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i. e.
“impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing;
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use);
(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods;
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion;
(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has been
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion;
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark,
“family” mark, product mark);
(10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior
mark: (a) a mere “consent” to register or use, (b) agreement provisions
designed to preclude confusion, i. e. limitations on continued use of the
marks by each party, (c) assignment of mark, application, registration and
good will of the related business, (d) laches and estoppel attributable to
owner of prior mark and indicative of lack of confusion;
(11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of
its mark on its goods;
(12) The extent of potential confusion, i. e., whether de minimis or
substantial;
(13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use.81
The factors are to be considered together, and mechanical formulas and
processes are disfavored.82

Id.
See Arrow Fastener Co., Inc. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 391 (2d Cir. 1995); see also
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:19.
81
82
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c. Trademark Dilution
The concept of trademark dilution is different from the likelihood of confusion
test for trademark infringement. Dilution by blurring “is an association arising from
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark.”83 In determining whether a mark or trade name
is likely to cause dilution by blurring, the court may consider all relevant factors,
including the following:
(i) the degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the
famous mark;
(ii) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark;
(iii) the extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in
substantially exclusive use of the mark;
(iv) the degree of recognition of the famous mark;
(v) whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an
association with the famous mark; and
(vi) any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark.84
There is also the concept of dilution by tarnishment, which is “an association
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that
harms the reputation of the famous mark.”85
There are also some exceptions, such as:
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or
facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than
as a designation of source for the person‘s own goods or services, including
use in connection with—
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods
or services; or
(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the
famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner.
(2) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.

15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2012).
Id.
85 Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
83
84
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(3) Any noncommercial use of a mark.86
Because anti-dilution protection allows a trademark owner to exclude others’ use
of a mark, there is a danger of harm to competition.87 Thus, anti-dilution protection
applies only to famous trademarks. 88 To qualify as a famous trademark for the
purposes of anti-dilution protection, a mark must be “widely recognized by the
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods
or services of the mark‘s owner.”89 When determining whether a mark possesses the
requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including
the following:
(1) the duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity
of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties;
(2) the amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services
offered under the mark; and
(3) the extent of actual recognition of the mark. 90
d. Bad Faith Intent
Because the ACPA does not require the use of a mark in commerce as a
necessary element, and the element of “identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark” merely indicates the trademark/domain name dispute, the element of
“bad faith intent to profit from the mark” becomes the most important requirement
in an ACPA claim.91 In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent for an
ACPA claim, a court may consider factors such as:
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any,
in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the
person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person;
(III) the person‘s prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with
the bona fide offering of any goods or services;

Id. § 1125(c)(3).
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:67.
88 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012); Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark
Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1157 (2006).
89 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
90 Id.
91 See Bhanu Sadasivan, Jurisprudence Under the In Rem Provisions of the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 237, 245–46 (2003) (noting the importance of the
bad faith intent to profit element).
86
87
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(IV) the person‘s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site
accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person‘s intent to divert consumers from the mark owner‘s online
location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the
goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the
intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the
site;
(VI) the person‘s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name
to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having
used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering
of any goods or services, or the person‘s prior conduct indicating a pattern of
such conduct;
(VII) the person‘s provision of material and misleading false contact
information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the
person‘s intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the
person‘s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person‘s registration or acquisition of multiple domain names
which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of
others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names,
or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of
registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or services
of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person’s domain name
registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of [the
TDRA].92
The law further prescribes that bad faith intent “shall not be found in any case
in which the court determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds
to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.”93
As Professor McCarthy notes, the first four factors suggest an absence of “bad
faith intent to profit from the goodwill of the mark, the next four tend to indicate that
such bad faith does exist and the last factor points in either direction, depending on
the degree of distinctiveness and fame of the mark.” 94 Reviewing all the factors
above, including the grounds on which bad faith intent shall not be found, it can be
determined that the element of “bad faith intent” is not just an element to review the
mental status or subjective understanding of the domain name holder, but rather is a
normative element to balance the interest of the trademark owner and domain name
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
94 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 25:78.
92
93
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holder. Congress expressed the purpose of the factors in determining bad faith intent
to profit by stating that “[t]hese factors are designed to balance the property interests
of trademark owners with the legitimate interests of Internet users and others who
seek to make lawful uses of others’ marks, including for purposes such as
comparative advertising, comment, criticism, parody, news reporting, fair use, etc.”95
Thus, the bad faith intent element functions as a border line for a domain name
worthy of protection and not worthy of protection against a trademark in the
trademark/domain name protection war.
In addition to the factors listed above by Congress, courts sometimes find unique
circumstances which “do not fit neatly into the specific factors enumerated by
Congress but may nevertheless be considered under the statute.”96 In Sporty’s Farm
LLC v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., the court found that the registration of a domain
name incorporating the mark of the trademark owner for the primary purpose of
keeping the trademark owner from using the domain name might constitute “bad
faith intent.”97
One interesting and worthy issue is how the concept of concurrent use of a
trademark98 applies to domain names. Shall we say “no” to concurrent use of domain
names, and return to the “first come, first served” policy, even though both parties
have a legitimate interest in the same name? Or should we give up the ACPA
considerations and rely on trademark infringement’s “likelihood to confusion” theory
to determine whether to allow similar domain names? Or should we still apply the
ACPA, and take the “bad faith intent” as a tool for interest balancing to solve the
problem? If so, what kind of factors should we balance in this situation? The Fourth
Circuit crafted a framework to address this issue in Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet
Domain Names.
[T]he legislative history of the ACPA demonstrates that Congress
recognized the legitimacy of concurrent use when it enacted the ACPA and
did not intend to disrupt the rights of legitimate concurrent users of a
mark. . . . Accordingly, we should apply the bad faith factors in a manner
that will not lead to a finding of bad faith registration every time a
concurrent user registers a mark. Of course, even recognizing the rights of
concurrent users of a mark, a legitimate concurrent user still violates the
other user‘s trademark rights if it uses the shared mark in a manner that
would cause consumer confusion, such as by using the mark in the other‘s
geographic area. Thus, if a concurrent user registers a domain name with
the intent of expanding its use of the shared mark beyond its geographically
H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 11 (1999).
Sporty’s Farm LLC v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 499 (2d Cir. 2000).
97 Id.
98 See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 233 (4th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that concurrent use is the “use of an identical mark by two different companies,” which
may be permitted if the concurrent use “is not likely to result in confusion, mistake, or deception”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012) (explaining that if the Director of the
PTO “determines that confusion, mistake, or deception is not likely to result from the continued use
by more than one person of the same or similar marks,” then concurrent registrations may be
issued).
95
96
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restricted area, then the domain name is registered in bad faith as outlined
in the ACPA.99
The court appears to have incorporated the “likelihood of confusion” theory into
the “bad faith intent” test. Following such a framework, a lawfully concurrent
trademark owner does not necessarily have a bad faith intent to register the domain
name with his or her shared trademark.100
B. Shielding Domain Names from Trademarks
1. Reverse Domain Name Hijacking Prevention Device
The domain name registrar or registry may have its own policy or
administrative procedure to address trademark/domain name disputes. 101 But
regardless of the usefulness of such a policy or administrative procedure, it is not the
law. 102 The situation in which a trademark owner takes advantage of an
administrative policy in bad faith to grab a domain name from a registrant is called
“reverse domain name hijacking” (“RDNH”).103 A domain name registrant thus needs
a shield to defend his or her domain name against RDNH. The Lanham Act provides
such a legal device for the original domain name registrant.

Harrods, 302 F.3d at 233–34 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 234. The Court mentioned a more difficult trademark/domain name conflict in a
footnote.
99

100

A more difficult problem . . . is created when a concurrent mark user registers a
domain name incorporating the shared mark with the intent only to use the
domain name within its limited geographic area, but the registrant‘s site is
nonetheless accessed by users outside the permissible geographic area. If the
registrant in this situation is deemed to violate the other user‘s trademark, then it
is unclear how (territorial) concurrent users of a mark can maintain an Internet
presence using their mark. This is one of the difficulties that courts and
legislatures will eventually have to face as they work to harmonize the
geographically limited nature of trademark law with the global nature of the
Internet as a medium.
Id. at 234 n. 9.
101 E.g., Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN [hereinafter UDRP],
http://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp/policy (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
102 Storey v. Cello Holdings, LLC, 347 F.3d 370, 381 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A]n administrative
proceeding [pursuant to UDRP requirements] does not preclude the registrant from vindicating his
rights under the ACPA or trademark law in court.”); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 25:74.75 (“A
UDRP panel decision certainly does not ‘bind’ a court of law in any way to follow the result of the
decision when it is later challenged in court.”).
103 Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN [hereinafter UDRP
Rules], https://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp/rules (last visited Mar. 3, 2013); Stephen J. Shaw,
Virtual Eviction: Kick Cybersquatters Off Your Domain, 13 S.C. LAW. 20, 22 (2002).
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If a registrar, registry, or other registration authority takes an action
described under clause (ii) 104 based on a knowing and material
misrepresentation by any other person that a domain name is identical to,
confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a mark, the person making the knowing
and material misrepresentation shall be liable for any damages, including
costs and attorney‘s fees, incurred by the domain name registrant as a
result of such action. The court may also grant injunctive relief to the
domain name registrant, including the reactivation of the domain name or
the transfer of the domain name to the domain name registrant.105
....
A domain name registrant whose domain name has been suspended,
disabled, or transferred under a policy described under clause (ii)(II) may,
upon notice to the mark owner, file a civil action to establish that the
registration or use of the domain name by such registrant is not unlawful
under this chapter. The court may grant injunctive relief to the domain
name registrant, including the reactivation of the domain name or transfer
of the domain name to the domain name registrant.106
Some commentators criticize courts for miscategorizing the second of the two
passages above as the ACPA‘s version of a remedy against “reverse domain name
hijacking,” 107 and instead, cite the first of the two passages above as the true
remedy.108 “Hijacking” has been defined as “the stealing of goods in transit,” which
“carries a connotation of conscious illegality.”109 While the element of “knowing and
material misrepresentation”110 reflects this conscious illegality, the second of the two

104

15 U.S.C § 1114(2)(D)(ii) (2012).
An action referred to under clause (i)(I) is any action of refusing to register,
removing from registration, transferring, temporarily disabling, or permanently
canceling a domain name—
(I) in compliance with a court order under section 1125(d) of this title;
or
(II) in the implementation of a reasonable policy by such registrar,
registry, or authority prohibiting the registration of a domain name that is
identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of another’s mark.

Id.

15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iv) (2012).
Id. § 1114(2)(D)(v).
107 E.g., Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 29 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating
that subsection (D)(v) is the RDNH provision); Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento
de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 625 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003) (same).
108 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 25:73.80.
109 Id.
110 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iv).
105
106
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passages contains no such element. 111 Despite this distinction, I will continue to
treat both subsections (D)(iv) and (D)(v) of 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) as RDNH in this
Article.
2. Applying RDNH Prevention
To establish a right to relief against an “overreaching trademark owner” under
subsection (D)(v), a plaintiff must establish:
(1) that it is a domain name registrant;
(2) that its domain name was suspended, disabled, or transferred under a
policy implemented by a registrar as described in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(2)(D)(ii)(II);
(3) that the owner of the mark that prompted the domain name to be
suspended, disabled, or transferred has notice of the action by service of
otherwise; and
(4) that the plaintiff’s registration or use of the domain name is not
unlawful under the Lanham Act, as amended.112
But the transfer of the domain name back to the plaintiff is not yet complete.
The second element above may be satisfied if the domain name registrant lost in an
administrative proceeding under the policy of the registrar, registry or domain name
authority.113 And even if the trademark owner is a foreigner, the fourth element’s
“not unlawful” requirement refers to U.S. law, not to the national law of the
trademark owner.114
An interesting issue surrounds the “policy implemented by a registrar, registry,
or domain name authority” aspect of the second element. Suspension, disablement
and transfer of a domain name as part of the administrative proceeding of the
registrar or registry is one situation in which an ACPA claim may be brought.115 But
the ACPA may also provide a registrant with injunctive relief against a registrar who
transferred the registered domain name pursuant to its own policy as part of a
foreign court proceeding, even though the registrant’s use of the domain name was

Id. § 1114(2)(D)(v).
Barcelona.com, Inc., 330 F.3d at 626.
113 See id. (stating that there was no dispute that the second element was satisfied because the
“domain name was suspended, disabled, or transferred under Network Solutions’ policy,” which had
incorporated the UDRP).
114 Id. at 627–28 (finding that the statutory language clearly supports the position that the
“cause of action created by Congress in [15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v)] requires the court adjudicating
such an action to determine whether the registration or use of the domain name violates the
Lanham Act”).
115 See id. at 626.
111
112
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not unlawful.116 Additionally, none of the elements above are to be jurisdictional, and
a U.S. court’s jurisdiction over a matter depends on whether a claimant has satisfied
the elements of an ACPA claim.117
IV. TRADEMARK/DOMAIN NAME PROTECTION UNDER THE UDRP
A. Tools for Trademark Owners to Fight Domain Name Registrants
1. Three-Element Threshold
The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) is a mandatory
administrative dispute resolution proceeding adopted by the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), 118 the entity responsible for the
management of the DNS.119 Generally, a domain name registration service contract
between a domain name registrar and the registrant incorporates the UDRP.120 The
applicable dispute or the substantive threshold includes the following three elements:
(a) The domain is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service
mark in which the complainant has rights;
(b) The domain name registrant has no rights or legitimate interest in
respect of the domain name; and
(c) The domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. 121
The UDRP is not a legally binding proceeding, but does have legal
implications.122 A registrant has ten days from the publication of an unfavorable
UDRP Panel decision to commence a lawsuit, or else the UDRP Panel’s decision will

116 Hawes v. Network Solutions, Inc., 337 F.3d 377, 386 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that registrant
stated a claim for injunctive relief under the ACPA against registrar by alleging that registrar
breached its own dispute resolution policy when it transferred a disputed domain name in a French
court).
117 Id. at 385.
118 UDRP, supra note 101.
119 Welcome to ICANN!, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/en/about/welcome (last visited Mar. 3,
2013).
120 UDRP, supra note 101; see also Stephen J. Ware, Domain-Name Arbitration in the
Arbitration-Law Context: Consent to, and Fairness in, the UDRP, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L.
129, 145 (2002).
121 UDRP, supra note 101, ¶ 4(a).
122 1 SUSAN SCHULTZ LALUK, INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE § 14:43 (2012); Chad D. Emerson,
Wasting Time in Cyberspace: The UDRP’s Inefficient Approach Toward Arbitrating Internet Domain
Name Disputes, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 161, 177 (2004) (noting that UDRP decisions are not the same
as a binding arbitration).
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be implemented. 123 In other words, the registrant can prevent execution of the
UDRP decision by filing a lawsuit in court. Even so, the UDRP is “a quick and
relatively inexpensive opportunity for the trademark owner to challenge the abusive
ownership of a domain name.”124
2. Applying the Threshold
The UDRP itself provides some guidelines for proving “registration and use in
bad faith.”125 Specifically, it provides that “the following circumstances, in particular
but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the
registration and use of a domain name in bad faith”:126
(i) circumstances indicating that [the registrant] ha[s] registered or ha[s]
acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or
otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant
who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that
complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of [the registrant’s]
documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name;
(ii) [the registrant] ha[s] registered the domain name in order to prevent the
owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a
corresponding domain name, provided that [the registrant] ha[s] engaged in
a pattern of such conduct;
(iii) [the registrant] ha[s] registered the domain name primarily for the
purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, [the registrant] ha[s] intentionally
attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to [the
registrant’s] web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of
confusion with the complainant‘s mark as to the source, sponsorship,
affiliation, or endorsement of [the registrant’s] web site or location or of a
product or service on [the registrant’s] web site or location.127
Paragraph 4(c) of the UDRP, on the other hand, requires the domain name
registrant to demonstrate his or her rights or legitimate interest under subparagraph
4(a)(ii), 128 which can be shown, without limitation, under the following
circumstances:

UDRP, supra note 101, ¶ 4(k).
Luke A. Walker, ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 289, 300 (2000).
125 UDRP, supra note 101, ¶ 4(b).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. ¶ 4(c).
123
124
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(i) before any notice to [the registrant] of the dispute, [the registrant’s] use
of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name
corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of
goods or services;
(ii) [the registrant] (as an individual, business, or other organization) ha[s]
been commonly known by the domain name, even if [the registrant] ha[s]
acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) [the registrant] [is] making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of
the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert
consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue. 129
The third element of the UDRP requires both registration and use of a domain
name in bad faith.130 What if the registration is in bad faith, but there is no use at
all? Some commentators call this “passive warehousing.” 131 The person who
conducts “passive warehousing” is a passive holder of a domain name or “pseudocybersquatter.”132 In the UDRP practice, panels developed the “inaction doctrine” to
address the issue of “passive warehousing.”133 An early case illustrating this concept
is Telstra Corp. v. Nuclear Marshmallows, 134 which concerned the “telstra.com”
domain name.135 The case held that even if there were no active use, certain factual
circumstances could still establish bad faith use.136 Other panels have followed this
approach in finding bad faith use, helping to develop the “inaction doctrine.” 137
“These panels typically appl[ied] a combination of two to four of the following factors:
(1) the domain name is identical to or closely resembles a widely known
trademark;
(2) the Respondent failed to deny any allegations in the complaint or
provide evidence of actual or planned good faith use;

Id.
UDRP, supra note 101, ¶ 4(a).
131 John G. White, ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy in Action, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 230 (2001).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 241–42.
134 Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Nuclear Marshmallows, World Intellectual Property Organization
[WIPO] Case No. D2000-0003 (WIPO Arbitration & Mediation Ctr. Feb. 18, 2000), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0003.html.
135 Id. ¶ 4.4.
136 Id. ¶ 7.10.
137 White, supra note 131, at 242–43 (citing eighteen cases in footnote); Atea Danmark A/S v.
Christer Joensson, WIPO Case No. D2012-1272 (WIPO Arbitration & Mediation Ctr. Aug. 20, 2012),
available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/text.jsp?case=D2012-1272 (explaining that
when “considering whether the passive holding [(‘inaction’)] of a domain name, following a bad faith
registration of it, satisfies the requirements of paragraph 4(a)(iii), the Administrative Panel must
give close attention to all the circumstances of the Respondent’s behaviour.”).
129
130
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(3) the Respondent failed to reply to cease-and-desist letters, e-mails, or
other correspondence from the Complainant sent prior to UDRP
proceedings;
(4) it is impossible to conceive of a legitimate active use of the domain name
by the Respondent considering the Complainant‘s trademark rights;
(5) the Respondent took active steps to conceal its identity by providing
false or incomplete contact information during domain name registration;
and
(6) the Respondent registered other domain names that are recognizable as
third party trademarks.138
The second and third elements appear to be separate and independent, but some
UDRP decisions take the position that a finding of bad faith registration based on a
“threat of infringement” might affect the registrant’s “potentially legitimate
noncommercial or fair uses of the domain name.” 139 But as the Madonna.com 140
panel stated:
First, Respondent contends that its use of the domain name for an
adult entertainment web site involved prior use of the domain name in
connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. The record
supports Respondent’s claim that it used the domain name in connection
with commercial services prior to notice of the dispute.
However,
Respondent has failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the selection
of Madonna as a domain name. . . . We find instead that name was selected
and used by Respondent with the intent to attract for commercial gain
Internet users to Respondent’s web site by trading on the fame of
Complainant’s mark.
We see no other plausible explanation for
Respondent’s conduct and conclude that use which intentionally trades on
the fame of another can not constitute a “bona fide” offering of goods or
services. To conclude otherwise would mean that a Respondent could rely
on intentional infringement to demonstrate a legitimate interest, an
interpretation that is obviously contrary to the intent of the Policy.141
The panel further stated:
Second, Respondent contends that it has rights in the domain name
because it registered MADONNA as a trademark in Tunisia prior to notice
White, supra note 131, at 242–43.
Id. at 245.
140 Madonna Ciccone v. Dan Parisi & “Madonna.com”, WIPO Case No. D2000-0847 (WIPO
Arbitration & Mediation Ctr. Oct. 12, 2000), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/
decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html.
141 Id. § 6(C).
138
139
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of this dispute. Certainly, it is possible for a Respondent to rely on a valid
trademark registration to show prior rights under the Policy. However, it
would be a mistake to conclude that mere registration of a trademark
creates a legitimate interest under the Policy. If an American-based
Respondent could establish “rights” vis a vis an American Complainant
through the expedient of securing a trademark registration in Tunisia, then
the ICANN procedure would be rendered virtually useless. To establish
cognizable rights, the overall circumstances should demonstrate that the
registration was obtained in good faith for the purpose of making bona fide
use of the mark in the jurisdiction where the mark is registered, and not
obtained merely to circumvent the application of the Policy.
Here, Respondent admits that the Tunisia registration was obtained
merely to protect his interests in the domain name. Respondent is not
located in Tunisia and the registration was not obtained for the purpose of
making bona fide use of the mark in commerce in Tunisia. A Tunisian
trademark registration is issued upon application without any substantive
examination. Although recognized by certain treaties, registration in
Tunisia does not prevent a finding of infringement in jurisdictions outside
Tunisia. Under the circumstances, some might view Respondent’s Tunisian
registration itself as evidence of bad faith because it appears to be a
pretense to justify an abusive domain name registration. We find at a
minimum that it does not evidence a legitimate interest in the disputed
name under the circumstances of this case. 142
According to WIPO statistics, the Madonna.com case is one of the twenty-five
most cited decisions in complaints, having been cited over 820 times. 143 Clearly,
then, the Madonna.com decision has significant influence in practice.
B. Domain Name Resistance Against Trademarks
1. Declaration of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking
The UDRP is a quick and inexpensive tool with which a trademark owner can
fight a domain name registrant, but it can be misused. The Rules for Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“Rules for UDRP”) section 1 defines RDNH
as “using the [UDRP] in bad faith to attempt to deprive a registered domain-name
holder of a domain name.”144 But there are no legal effects or factual disadvantages
for RDNH under the UDRP; the Rules for UDRP require only a declaration of RDNH

Id.
25 Most Cited Decisions in Complaint, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
amc/en/domains/statistics/cases_cited.jsp?party=C (last visited Mar. 3, 2013)
144 UDRP Rules, supra note 103, § 1.
142
143

[12:350 2013]

The Trademark / Domain Name Protection War:
A Comparative Study of the U.S., UDRP and Taiwan Law

377

in the UDRP decision. 145 No additional sanctions are available. 146 The pertinent
portion of the Rules for UDRP section 15(e) states that:
If after considering the submissions the Panel finds that the complaint was
brought in bad faith, for example in an attempt at Reverse Domain Name
Hijacking or was brought primarily to harass the domain-name holder, the
Panel shall declare in its decision that the complaint was brought in bad
faith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding.147
2. Practice of the RDNH Declaration
Although there are some guidelines for “bad faith” registration and use of a
domain name under the UDRP, 148 the UDRP does not provide any direction for bad
faith under RDNH. In Fondation Le Corbusier v. Monsieur Bernard Weber, Madame
Hiedi Weber,149 the WIPO Panel listed some previous panel opinions for finding “bad
faith” under RDNH:
1. [T]he complainant knew of the respondent’s unassailable right or
legitimate interest in the disputed domain name or the clear lack of bad
faith registration and use, and nevertheless brought the complaint; 150
2. [T]he complaint was brought in knowing disregard of the likelihood that
the respondent possessed legitimate interests;151
3. [T]he complainant knew it had no rights in the trademark or service
mark upon which it relied and nevertheless brought the complaint in bad
faith.152
At least one other panelist has taken a very different view of bad faith under
RDNH. That panelist contended that if the complainant “has not even made a
minimal effort to establish plausible grounds for bringing the Complaint” under the
145 Robert C. Houser, The Domain Name Game: New Rules Speed Wins for Trademark Owners,
37 ARIZ. ATT‘Y. 17, 21 (2000).
146 Id.
147 UDRP Rules, supra note 103, § 15(e).
148 UDRP, supra note 101, ¶ 4(b).
149 Fondation Le Corbusier v. Monsieur Bernard Weber, Madame Hiedi Weber, WIPO Case No.
D2003-0251 (WIPO Arbitration & Mediation Ctr. July 4, 2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/
amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2003/d2003-0251.html.
150 Id. § 6(E) (citing Sydney Opera House Trust v. Trilynx Pty. Ltd., WIPO Case No. D20001224 (WIPO Arbitration & Mediation Ctr. Nov. 8, 2000); Goldline Int’l, Inc. v. Gold Line., WIPO
Case No. D2000-1151 (WIPO Arbitration & Mediation Ctr. Jan. 8, 2001)).
151 Id. (citing Smart Design LLC v. Hughes, WIPO Case No. D2000-0993 (WIPO Arbitration &
Mediation Ctr. Oct. 21, 2000)).
152 Id. (citing Dan Zuckerman v. Vincent Peeris, WIPO Case No. DBIZ2002-00245 (WIPO
Arbitration & Mediation Ctr. Aug. 12, 2002); Her Majesty the Queen (NZ) v. Virtual Countries, Inc.,
WIPO Case No. D2002-0754 (WIPO Arbitration & Mediation Ctr. Nov. 27, 2002)).
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UDRP, and if the respondent did not “ma[k]e an effort to explain to the Complainant
the bona fide nature of its use of the Domain Name and the basis for the price” at
which it offered to sell the domain name, it would be “unduly harsh to characterize
the Complaint as reverse domain name hijacking.”153 Professor Froomkin points out,
however, that the panelist espousing this view never identified a duty under UDRP
for the respondent to “educate people who negligently send you threatening letters”
without conducting any investigation. 154 This Article agrees with the principle
alluded to by Professor Froomkin because imposing a simple investigative duty on
the complainant, instead of an education burden on the respondent, represents a
minimal social cost.
Professor Zainol conducted research on RDNH cases under the UDRP and
concluded that:
1. A new paragraph 4(d) should be inserted in the UDRP policy, outlining
clearly the scope and elements of RDNH.
2. A finding of RDNH must be accompanied by some form of sanction, either
monetary or administrative.155
From the above suggestion, we can see that the administrators of the UDRP
must pay more attention to the interests of domain name registrants in the
trademark/domain name protection war.
V. TRADEMARK/DOMAIN NAME PROTECTION UNDER TAIWANESE LAW
A. Legal Device for Trademark Owners Against Domain Name Registrants
Amendments to Taiwanese Trademark Law, passed by the Legislative Yuan
(which functions as the Congress of Taiwan),156 were promulgated by Presidential
Order on June 29, 2011, and went into effect on July 1, 2012.157 This Article refers to
the pre-amendment law as the “Old Law,”158 and the current Taiwanese Trademark

153 Deutsche Welle v. DiamondWare Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2000-1202, § 6 (WIPO Arbitration
& Mediation Ctr. Jan. 2, 2001), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/
2000/d2000-1202.html.
154 A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy”—Causes and (Partial)
Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 670 (2002).
155 Zinatul A. Zainol, The Chronicles of Electronic Commerce: Reverse Domain Name Hijacking
Under the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, 16 EUR. L.J. 233, 241–42 (2010).
156 Foreword, LEGIS. YUAN OF REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://www.ly.gov.tw/en/01_introduce/
introView.action?id=1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
157 商 標 法 [Trademark Act], 中 華 民 國 現 行 法 規 彙 編 [Xianxing Fagui Huibian] (Taiwan)
[hereinafter Trademark Act of 2011], available at http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/Taipei/Comlaw/
1209_Trademark_Act_2011.pdf.
158 商標法 [Trademark Act], 中華民國現行法規彙編 [Xianxing Fagui Huibian] (2003, amended
by Presidential Order in 2010) (Taiwan) [hereinafter Trademark Act of 2003], available at
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Law as the “New Law.” In addition to the New Law, the Fair Trade Act is another
legal device for protecting trademarks, especially unregistered marks, against
domain name disputes.159
1. In the Old Law
Article 61, section 1 of the Old Law provided a remedy for trademark
infringement.160 It stated:
A trademark right holder may claim for damages from a person infringing
whose trademark rights, and may request for excluding infringement
thereto; in case of likelihood of infringement, the said right holder may also
request for the prevention thereof. 161
Article 61, section 2 defined trademark infringement as the use of a trademark
under the conditions stipulated by Article 29, section 2, without the consent of a
trademark right holder.162 The conditions set forth by Article 29, section 2 included:
1. One who wishes to use a trademark that is identical to a registered
trademark on identical goods or services;
2. One who wishes to use a trademark that is identical to a registered
trademark on similar goods or services, and hence it is likely to cause
confusion to relevant consumers; or
3. One who wishes to use a trademark that is similar to a registered
trademark on the identical or similar goods or services, and hence it is
likely to cause confusion to relevant consumers. 163
In addition to trademark infringement, Article 62 of the Old Law also defined socalled “constructive infringement”:
A trademark right infringement shall be deemed to have occurred where
consent of trademark right holder is absent from any of the following
conditions:

http://www.tipo.gov.tw/en/AllInOne_Show.aspx?guid=4a8aa2e9-3d32-4fa1-972c-a37d90f0107e&lang
=en-us&path=1461.
159 公平交易法 [Fair Trade Act], 中華民國現行法規彙編 [Xianxing Fagui Huibian] (Taiwan)
[hereinafter Fair Trade Act], available at http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx
?uid=644&docid=12106.
160 Trademark Act of 2003, supra note 158, art. 61.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. art. 29.
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1. Knowingly using a trademark identical or similar to a well-known
registered trademark of another person, or using the word(s) contained in
the said well-known trademark as the company name, trade name or
domain name or any other representation identifying the body or source of
whose business, and hence diluting the distinctiveness or reputation of the
said well-known trademark; or
2. Knowingly using the word(s) contained in a registered trademark of
another person as the company name, trade name or domain name or any
other representation identifying the body or source of whose business, and
hence causing confusion to relevant consumers of goods or services
thereof.164
Thus, under the Old Law, knowingly using the words contained in a registered
mark of another person as a domain name would be “constructive infringement” if it
was a famous trademark and the use caused dilution, or if the mark was a registered
trademark and the use caused confusion.
2. In the New Law
Article 68 of the New Law gives the definition of trademark infringement as
follows:
Any of the following act[s], in the course of trade and without consent of the
proprietor of a registered trademark, constitutes infringement of the right
of such trademark:
(1) using a trademark which is identical with the registered trademark in
relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which it is
registered;
(2) using a trademark which is identical with the registered trademark and
used in relation to goods or services similar to those for which the registered
one is designated, and hence there exists a likelihood of confusion on
relevant consumers; or
(3) using a trademark which is similar to the registered trademark and
used in relation to goods or services identical with or similar to those for
which the registered one is designated, and hence there exists a likelihood
of confusion on relevant consumers. 165
Article 69, section 1 of the New Law provides the same remedy for trademark
infringement as the Old Law:
damages, requests for the cessation of the
164
165

Id. art. 62.
Trademark Act of 2011, supra note 157, art. 68.
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infringement, and requests for an injunction where a likelihood of infringement
exists.166
In addition to actual infringement, there is also “constructive infringement” in
the New Law, 167 but the New Law appears to modify the scope of constructive
infringement, especially with respect to the pertinent portion of the domain name.
Article 70 of the New Law uses the following conditions for constructively infringing
a trademark:
(1) knowingly using a trademark which is identical with or similar to
another person’s well-known registered trademark, and hence there exists a
likelihood of dilution of the distinctiveness or reputation of the said wellknown trademark;
(2) knowingly using words contained in another person’s well-known
registered trademark as the name of a company, business, group or domain
or any other name that identifies a business entity, and hence there exists a
likelihood of confusion on relevant consumers or a likelihood of dilution of
the distinctiveness or reputation of the said well-known trademark; or
(3) manufacturing, possessing, displaying, selling, exporting or importing
labels, tags, packaging or containers that have not been applied in relation
to goods or services, or articles that have not been applied in relation to
services, knowing that such articles would likely infringe trademark rights
as prescribed in Article 68.168
3. Legislative Intent of the Portion of the 2011 Amendment that Relates to Domain
Names
Under both the Old Law and the New Law, domain name registration that
incorporates the text of a trademark of another person (hereinafter referred to as a
“suspect registration”) could constitute constructive infringement.169 Nevertheless,
there are two main differences between the Old and New laws. The first main
difference is that the Old Law requires the suspect registration to cause actual
dilution of a famous, registered trademark.170 But in the New Law, a likelihood of
dilution of the registered famous trademark is sufficient for constructive
infringement.171
The second difference is that, under the Old Law, it was necessary to show that
a suspect registration caused actual consumer confusion for the consumer of the
166 Compare Trademark Act of 2011, supra note 157, art. 69, with Trademark Act of 2003,
supra note 158, art. 61.
167 Trademark Act of 2011, supra note 157, art. 70.
168 Id.
169 Trademark Act of 2003, supra note 158, art. 62; Trademark Act of 2011, supra note 157,
art. 70.
170 Trademark Act of 2003, supra note 158, art. 62.
171 Trademark Act of 2011, supra note 157, art. 70.
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goods or services. 172 The New Law, however, removes the explicit statutory
protection for the non-famous registered trademark against suspect registrations.173
The legislative rationale articulated is that, in accord with section 43 of the
Lanham Act and the TDRA, the New Law strengthens the protection of famous
trademarks; in the Old Law, it was very difficult to prove actual dilution, regardless
of blurring or tarnishment. 174 The actual dilution requirement in the Old Law
precluded the owner of a famous trademark from obtaining injunctive relief to
prevent future injury. 175 The legislative reason also indicated that the Old law
provided too broad of protection for the registered trademark where the “famous” or
“well-known” is not really required.176 There have been some situations in practice
where a trademark owner sent cease-and-desist letters in abuse of his or her
rights,177 and Taiwanese courts have held that the announcement of the registration
of the trademark itself gives everyone knowledge of the registered trademark, 178
satisfying another element of constructive infringement.179 This allows for serious
abuses of trademark rights, and so the New Law removes the constructive
infringement protection for the registered trademark. 180 Because of this amendment,
excluding famous trademarks, it seems that there is no protection for the registered
trademark against suspect registration under the New Law.
4. The Fair Trade Act
Article 20, section 1 of the Fair Trade Act provides protection for unregistered
trade identifiers against unfair competition by prescribing that:

Trademark Act of 2003, supra note 158, art. 62.
See Trademark Act of 2011, supra note 157, art. 70 (imposing a requirement of “likelihood of
confusion,” rather than actual confusion).
174 Shangbiaofa Xiuzheng Caoan Tiaowen Duizhaobiao (商標法修正草案條文對照表) [Clause
Comparison Table for the Draft of Revisions to the Trademark Law], Legislative Yuan (May 31,
2011) (Taiwan) [hereinafter Legislative Rationale]. Compare Trademark Act of 2003, supra note
158, art. 62 (providing that trademark infringement occurs when (1) a party knows that it is using
the same or similar mark as a registered trademark and its use detracts from the trademark‘s
reputation or (2) a party knows that the trademark it is using has been registered by another party
and the use causes consumer confusion), with Trademark Act of 2011, supra note 157, art. 70
(stating that trademark infringement occurs when (1) a party knows that it is using a registered
trademark and its use is likely to detract from the distinctiveness or reputation of the registered
trademark, (2) a party knows that it is using a registered trademark and its use is likely to cause
consumer confusion or detract from the identification of the registered trademark or (3) a party
knows that there is a danger of violating Article 68 for the manufacture, possession, display, sale,
export or import of goods containing the registered trademark‘s trade dress) (emphasis added).
175 Legislative Rationale, supra note 174 (explaining that article 62 in the Old Law does not
use “may” have impaired a trademark‘s recognition or reputation, and, therefore, the trademark
owner cannot protect itself until actual damage occurs, and that it is often difficult for the
trademark owner to prove actual damage has occurred).
176 Id.
177 See id.
178 See id.
179 See id. (explaining amendment to article 62).
180 Id.
172
173
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No enterprise shall have any of the following acts with respect to the goods
or services it supplies:
1. using in the same or similar manner, the personal name, business or
corporate name, or trademark of another, or container, packaging, or
appearance of another‘s goods, or any other symbol that represents such
person’s goods, commonly known to relevant enterprises or consumers,
so as to cause confusion with such person’s goods; or selling,
transporting,
exporting, or importing goods bearing
such
representation;
2. using in the same or similar manner, the personal name, business or
corporate name, or service mark of another, or any other symbol that
represents such person’s business or service, commonly known to
relevant enterprises or consumers, so as to cause confusion with the
facilities or activities of the business or service of such person; or
3. using on the same or similar goods the mark that is identical or
similar to a well-known foreign trademark that has not been registered
in this country; or selling, transporting, exporting, or importing goods
bearing such trademark.181
5. Practice and Application of the Legal Device
a. UDRP in Taiwanese Courts
It appears that there is only one case involving the legal effect of a UDRP
decision in the Taiwanese courts, known as the “yageo.com” case. 182 A National
Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) decided the case under the UDRP before it was heard in a
Taiwanese court. 183 The trademark owner of the mark—Yageo—won the UDRP
case.184 The domain name registrant brought the case into a Taiwanese court, where
Yageo argued that the UDRP decision given by the NAF panelist was an award of
arbitration made in the United States that must be given full faith and credit under
the “Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the Republic of China
and the United States of America.”185 The original registrant of the domain name
responded that according to the UDRP 4(k), the court was not bound by the award of
arbitration made by NAF under UDRP, and was free to make an independent
decision.186 The court’s final decision was in favor of Yageo, reasoning that because
Fair Trade Act, supra note 159, art. 20.
Unspecified v. Yageo Corp., 2002 Shang Tzi No. 357 (Taiwan High Court May 10, 2002).
183 Yageo Corp. v. OneWorld, National Arbitration Forum [NAF] No. FA0009000095702 (NAF
Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/95702.htm.
184 Id.
185 Fang Guo Jun v. Yageo Corp., 2002 Shang Tzi No. 357 (Taiwan High Ct. May 10, 2002).
186 Id.
181
182
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the NAF had already scrutinized the pleadings, responses, and all submissions of
evidence, the NAF award was the result of an arbitration, which qualified as a
legitimate cause for Yageo to retrieve the domain name from the original
registrant.187
The court seriously misunderstood how much weight to give to the UDRP
decision, which it believed to be a binding award of arbitration. The Yageo court was
misled by the parties’ arguments: While Yageo argued that the UDRP was an award
of arbitration made in the United States, the original registrant argued the court
should not be bound by “the award of arbitration made by NAF.”188 Yageo made the
court believe that the UDRP decision equaled to an award of arbitration because both
parties said it was an award of arbitration. 189 And the translation of “Forum” in
Mandarin, which is the official language in Taiwan, is just like “Court.” So the
translation of “National Arbitration Forum” into Mandarin is “the U.S. Nation
Arbitration Court”, something that sounds like a special U.S. court that has
jurisdiction over arbitration. Thus, it seemed straightforward for the Yageo court to
hold that the arbitration award from a special U.S. court should be given full faith
and credit under the Treaty. The UDRP decision, however, is just a product of an
administrative proceeding, provided for by a contract between the domain name
registrant and registrar, for the benefit of a trademark owner.190 It has no binding
effect because the losing party can bring the case into a national court with
jurisdiction under UDRP paragraph 4(k).191 Obviously, the Taiwanese court was not
familiar with UDRP at the time of the Yageo case.
Id.
Id.
189 Id.
190 UDRP, supra note 101, ¶ 4.
191 Id. Paragraph 4, part k of the UDRP states:
187
188

The mandatory administrative proceeding requirements set forth in Paragraph
4 shall not prevent either you or the complainant from submitting the dispute to a
court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before such mandatory
administrative proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is concluded. If an
Administrative Panel decides that your domain name registration should be canceled
or transferred, we will wait ten (10) business days (as observed in the location of our
principal office) after we are informed by the applicable
Provider of the
Administrative Panel’s decision before implementing that decision. We will then
implement the decision unless we have received from you during that ten (10)
business day period official documentation (such as a copy of a complaint, filestamped by the clerk of the court) that you have commenced a lawsuit against the
complainant in a jurisdiction to which the complainant has submitted under
Paragraph 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure. (In general, that jurisdiction is either
the location of our principal office or of your address as shown in our Whois database.
See Paragraphs 1 and 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure for details.) If we receive
such documentation within the ten (10) business day period, we will not implement
the Administrative Panel‘s decision, and we will take no further action, until we
receive (i) evidence satisfactory to us of a resolution between the parties; (ii) evidence
satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been dismissed or withdrawn; or (iii) a copy of
an order from such court dismissing your lawsuit or ordering that you do not have the
right to continue to use your domain name.
Id.

[12:350 2013]

The Trademark / Domain Name Protection War:
A Comparative Study of the U.S., UDRP and Taiwan Law

385

After the Yageo case, Taiwanese courts seem to have had several opportunities
to address the product of domain name dispute resolution administrative
proceedings. The Taiwan Network Information Center Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (“TWDRP”) is an administrative proceeding for domain names with
the TLD “.tw”.192 Among eight cases involving the TWDRP, the Taiwanese courts
failed to take a consistent position regarding the legal effect of the TWDRP. In the
three cases involving disputed domain names, googlemap.com.tw, icrtmall.com.tw,
and skii.com.tw, the court wrongly dismissed the cases, reasoning that there was no
case or controversy between the trademark owner and domain name registrant
because the domain name service contract is between the registrant and registrar,
rather than the trademark owner. 193 In the cases of decathlon.com.tw and
vitamix.com, the court did not address the legal effect of the TWDRP decision in the
lawsuit.194 In the cases of cambridge.com.tw and nba.com.tw, the courts correctly
announced that the TWDRP is a non-binding decision.195 In a rare exception, the
court in bosch.com.tw reviewed the TWDRP decision de novo.196
b. Trademark Law Connotation (2005)
The Taiwan Intellectual Property Office (“TIPO”) published the Trademark Law
Connotation (“the Connotation”) for the Old Law in May 2005.197 Because TIPO is
the government agency that drafted the Trademark Law, its Connotation is very
important to the application and practice of Trademark Law. Article 62 is the most
relevant part for the trademark/domain name dispute under the Trademark Law. 198
The Connotation gives the following instructions for constructive trademark
infringement stipulated by Article 62 in the Old Law:199
This Article prescribes the main type of trademark infringement. Although
Article 61, section 2 defines trademark infringement, it only addresses
when a third party uses the identical or similar trademark on identical or
similar goods or service. However, shall the protection for a famous
trademark extend to non-similar goods or service? Or shall it be deemed as
192 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, Arts. 1 & 2, TAIWAN NETWORK INFO. CTR.,
http://www.twnic.net.tw/english/dn/dn_04.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
193 Wisdom United Digital Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Google Corp., 2008 Zhi Tzi No. 18 (Taipei Dist.
Ct. Nov. 6, 2008); Senqui Int’l, Inc. v. Taipei Int’l Cmty. Cultural Found., 2007 Zhi Tzi No. 81 (Taipei
Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2008); Holy Power Bus. Mgmt. Consulting Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Corp., 2002
Su Tzi No. 3223 (Taipei Dist. Ct. Oct. 30, 2002).
194 Decathlon S.A. v. Zhang Rong Corp., 2003 Su Tzi No. 4370 (Taipei Dist. Ct. Mar. 5, 2004);
Taiwan Network Info. Ctr. v. Vita-Max Corp., 2007 Su Tzi No. 3985 (Taipei Dist. Ct. Nov. 19, 2007).
195 Cambridge Univ. v. ILTEA, 2003 Minshangsu Tzi No. 12 (Intellectual Prop. Ct. Dec. 2,
2003); Taiwan v. Quanwen Computer Typesetting Corp., 2002 Guomaoshang Tzi No. 4 (Taiwan
High Ct. Nov. 7, 2002).
196 Bosch Corp. v. Robert Bosch, 2002 Su Tzi No. 91 (Taipei Dist. Ct. Mar. 27, 2003).
197 See Shangbiaofa Zhutiao Shiyi（商標法逐條釋義）[Trademark Law Connotation], Taiwan
Intellectual Property Office (May 2005) (Taiwan).
198 See id. art. 62.
199 This translation of the Connotation was prepared by this Author.
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trademark infringement if there is no trademark use, but the trademark is
already substantially infringed? There is no such stipulation under Article
61, section 2. There have been more and more instances of trademark
infringement and conflicts. This Article is enacted to clarify and prevent
any controversies.
Section 1 is the constructive infringement of a famous trademark. Since this
is constructive infringement, a strict construction should be adopted.
1.

“Knowingly” means “clearly know.” One who argues the existence of
the fact should have the burden to prove it. It is not “knowingly,” if
negligently not known. The objective of the knowledge includes that
the trademark is registered, and that the trademark is famous.

2.

“Using of identical or similar trademark” indicates the trademark use
defined under Article 6.200 It is different from the latter part of this
section “using the word(s) contained in the famous trademark as the
company name, etc.” The latter is non-trademark use. And is there
any limitation on the goods or service that is being used? With the
reference of Article 61, section 2 and Article 29, section 2, the goods
and service which the trademark is used shall confine to those not the
same or similar as the famous trademark designated to use. Because
if it is the same or similar goods or service as the famous trademark
designated to use, it already has automatically constituted trademark
infringement as provided in Article 61, section 2, and there will be no
necessity to make it “constructive infringement” under this section.

3.

“Using the word(s) contained in the said famous trademark” means
using the exact word(s) identical to the dominant part of the famous
trademark which is used to distinguish from others’ goods or service
and draw the consumer’s attention. Does it include the similar word(s)
to the words contained in the famous trademark? With the reference
that there is no “identical or similar” term in this part of this section,
obviously different from the former part of this section, and it is
already “constructive infringement,” it would not be suitable to give
the interpretation that the protection scope extends to the similar
word(s) in the famous trademark. It would be identical word(s) if it is
so under the social consensus, however, for example, the identical
words written in a different kind of style.

200

Trademark Act 0f 2003, supra note 158, art. 6. Article 6 provides:

Id.

The term, use of trademark, as referred to in this Act connotes the utilization for
marketing purpose of trademark on goods, services or relevant articles thereof, or
the utilization through means of two-dimensional graphic, audio and visual
digitization, electronic media, or other mediums to sufficiently make relevant
consumers recognize it as a trademark.

386
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4.

“Using as the company name, trade name” means the company name
under Corporation Law, and trade name under Business Registration
Law. If used as any other legal person’s or non-legal group’s name,
and the legal person or group has the fact to carry on business, it
would be in the scope of “any other representation identifying the body
or source of whose business.”

5.

“Blurring the distinctiveness or tarnishing the reputation of the
famous trademark” is different from “likely to blur the distinctiveness
or tarnish the reputation of the said famous trademark or mark” under
the Article 23, section 1(12) of this Law 201 to a certain extent. The
application of this section requires the occurrence of actual dilution,
mere “likely to dilute” is not enough.

387

Section 2 is constructive infringement for general registered trademarks.
The main difference of this section and section 1 is that the registered
trademark in this section is not famous. Only the following two points need
to be clarified. Other connotations should refer to the one under section 1.
1. Because the “registered trademark” under this section is not a famous
one, the scope of constructive infringement is smaller than that for a
famous trademark.
It requires “causing confusion to relevant
consumers of goods or services thereof.” If there is only the “dilution”
result under section 1, and not to the extent of “causing confusion to
relevant consumers of goods or services thereof,” there is no application
of this section. For example, using the word(s) contained in the
trademark of another person for one’s own company name, but there is
no market competition, nor is the business identical or similar, this
section does not apply if there is no confusion to relevant consumers of
designated goods or services. However, if the registered trademark is
famous, and its reputation is well-known by consumers of different
businesses, the association thereof makes dilution, but not confusion,
yet, while this section does not apply, section 1 could possibly apply if
all other elements are satisfied. In the same rationale, using the
word(s) contained in the trademark of another person purely for one’s
domain name, but there is no other conduct like e-commerce involved,
generally speaking, the pure registration of the domain name does not
201 Trademark Act of 2003, supra note 158, art. 23, section 1(12). The text of Article 23, section
1(12) says:

Id.

[one of the certain circumstances that would cause refused registration: the
prospect trademark] that is identical or similar to another person’s well-known
trademark or mark and hence is likely to confuse the relevant public or likely to
dilute the distinctiveness or reputation of the said well-known trademark or
mark. However, the aforementioned shall not apply to an application filed with
consent from the owner of the said well-known trademark or mark.
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easily cause confusion to relevant consumers, and this section of course
does not apply. However, if the registered trademark is famous, and
the registration of the domain name is in bad faith and causes blurring
the distinctiveness or tarnishing the reputation, there is no guarantee
that section 1 does not apply.
2. Although there is no limitation like under Article 61, section 2, and
Article 29, section 2, which requires the identical or similar goods or
services, for the element of this section, while interpreting “using the
word(s) . . . as any other representation identifying the body or source
of whose business, it should take the maintenance of fair market
competition into consideration.” Thus, the property of goods or services
provided by the business owner, whether it is identical or similar goods
or services that are designated by the registered trademark, whether
the market competition exists, all should be taken into account to
determine whether the confusion to relevant consumers of goods or
services thereof resulted, so that the scope of protection for constructive
infringement will not go too far beyond the legislative protection of the
trademark.
With a closer look to the Connotation pertinent to domain names, we see that
TIPO has no strong inclination to read cybersquatters into the scope of protection of
Article 62, section 1, namely, the anti-dilution protection for famous trademarks.
The original language used in the Connotation is “if the registered trademark is
famous, and the registration of the domain name is in bad faith and causes blurring
the distinctiveness or tarnishing the reputation, there is no guarantee that section
1 does not apply.” 202 Double negatives were used to imply that a cybersquatter
could possibly be liable for trademark dilution. The Connotation of Article 62 also
demonstrated TIPO’s careful attitude to the application of trademark dilution. As
listed above, the Connotation of Article 62 emphasized several times that the article
should be construed strictly and should not cover too broadly. 203 For example, it
stated “[s]ince this is constructive infringement, a strict construction should be
adopted;”204 “and it is already ‘constructive infringement,’ it would not be suitable to
give the interpretation that the protection scope extends to the similar word(s) in the
famous trademark;”205 “it should take the maintenance of fair market competition
into consideration;”206 “the scope of protection for constructive infringement will not
go too far beyond the legislative protection of the trademark.”207
This attitude corresponds to what is mentioned in the legislative history for the
New Law: “[B]ecause in the Old Law, it is very difficult to prove actual dilution,

See Trademark Law Connotation, supra note 197, art. 62 (emphasis added).
See id.
204 Id. (translation by Author).
205 Id. (translation by Author).
206 Id. (translation by Author).
207 Id. (translation by Author).
202
203
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regardless of blurring the distinctiveness or tarnishing the reputation of a
trademark. The actual dilution requirement in the Old Law precluded a famous
trademark from the prevention of actual damages in advance.” Thus, the New Law
amended the “actual dilution” requirement to a “likelihood of dilution” for famous
trademarks.
c. Judicial Practice of Constructive Infringement
In contrast to the careful attitude of TIPO toward constructive infringement
under Article 62, it seems that the courts have no difficulty in finding that dilution
actually occurred. In a case involving the disputed domain name, “chanelpawnshop.com,” the Intellectual Property Court (“IP Court”) held that the registrant
of the disputed domain name was liable for constructive infringement under Article
62, section 1, in the Old Law and reasoned:
The registrant with the knowledge that “Chanel” is a famous registered
trademark, and without the consent of the trademark owner, used the word
“Chanel,” “Xiang naier” (transliteration of “Chanel” in Mandarin) as its
trade name, company name, and domain name. In addition, the registrant
also made representation identifying the body or source of its business as
well and promoted its business in the billboard, business card,
advertisement in the newspaper, and webpage. Such promotion is for the
business of the pawn and reasonably priced jewel that is far from the
delicate, fashion, taste image of the plaintiff, so the conduct of the
defendant caused the weakening of the distinctiveness of the trademark
“Chanel” to identify the goods and service provided by the plaintiff. Thus,
the distinctiveness of this famous trademark has the danger of being
diminished, devalued, and diluted. 208
However, the IP Court did not explain why the promotion of business that is far from
the image of a famous trademark causes that trademark to be diluted.
In the case of the disputed domain name, “swarov.com.tw,” the IP Court held the
registration and use of the domain name diluted the famous trademark “Swarovski,”
though “swarov” is not the exact word as “Swarovski.”209 The IP court gave its reason
as follows:
The plaintiff’s trademark “Swarovski” and “Shi hua luo shi qi”
(transliteration of “Swarovski” in Mandarin) are famous trademarks of
goods or services of crystal and jewelry, commonly recognized by general
consumers as well. The defendant’s business was in the business of leasing
ceremonial dresses or wedding dresses. These dresses usually match well
208 Chanel Corp. v. Xiang Naier, 2010 Minshangsu Tzi No. 32 (Intellectual Prop. Ct. Apr. 21,
2011) (translation by Author).
209 Swarovski Corp. v. Swarovski Wedding Photography Corp., 2011 Minshangsu Tzi No. 44
(Intellectual Prop. Ct. May 18, 2012).
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with the goods of crystal and jewelry to add to their value. This could also
be proven by the defendant’s use of the words “Wedding Dress Boutique” in
the advertisements. Thus, it could make general consumers confused to
think that the source of these two goods or services is identical, or they are
the serial goods or services from the identical source, or misunderstand that
the users of these two marks “Swarovski” and “swarov” / “Shi Hua Luo Shi
Qi” and “Shi Hua Luo” must have some relationship by related
corporations, licensing, franchising, or some other similar relation. Thus,
the conduct of defendant had weakened the distinctiveness of the famous
trademark to identify its goods or service. . . . The defendant set up the
company named “‘Shi Hua Luo’ Wedding Dress and Photography Ltd. Co.,”
on Oct 8, 2004, used the word “Shi Hua Luo” as its dominant part of
company name, had the billboard “Shi Hua Luo Wedding Dress Boutique”
and “Swarov,” until now. It also kept using business cards, calendar cards,
wedding memo notes, and some other publicity materials with the words
“Shi Hua Luo Wedding Dress Boutique” and took “www.swarov.com.tw” as
its official website’s domain name. All these uses of “Shi Hua Luo”,
“Swarov” or “Shi Hua Luo Wedding Dress,” and “Shi Hua Luo Wedding
Dress Boutique” were conduct of trademark use that constituted
constructive infringement of a trademark under Article 62, section 1.210
One inference from above is that the IP court seems to have created confusion
between “likelihood of confusion” and “dilution of the distinctiveness.” If consumers
think that different goods or services have the same source or some similar
relationship when they have nothing in common, that is supposed to constitute
“confusion,” not just “dilution of the distinctiveness.” Moreover, we do not see
evidence of “confusion” demonstrated by the trademark owner in the court’s
reasoning.
d. Judicial Practice of the Fair Trade Act
The court also had no difficulty holding registrants liable for an unfair
competition claim under Article 20, section 1(2) of the Fair Trade Act, for registering
a domain name that incorporated a famous trademark. 211 The disputes over the
domain names “nba.com.tw” and “decathlon.com.tw” with corresponding trademarks
are good examples of this. In the NBA case,212 the court reasoned:
Regarding to “using in the same or similar manner” of Article 20, section
1(2) under Fair Trade Act, “the same manner” means the same word,
picture, mark, goods containers, package, shape, or its whole appearance,
arrangement, color set; “the similar manner” means imitating the dominant
Id. (translation by Author).
Id.
212 Taiwan v. Quanwen Computer Typesetting Corp., 2002 Guomaoshang Tzi No. 4 (Taiwan
High Ct. Nov. 7, 2002).
210
211
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part, have the relevant enterprise or consumers likely to confuse while
buying and paying common attention. Thus, Article 20, section 1(2) under
the Fair Trade Act prohibits the same or similar use of conduct, not confines
to the same or similar goods or services. Although the appellee’s business
that “NBA” represents is the sport contest, and entertainment information,
not the book retails, the appellant’s use of “NBA” for the internet service (of
book retails) also constitutes infringement of Article 20, section 1(2) under
the Fair Trade Act.213
Perhaps the “NBA” trademark is too famous for the court to have other concerns.
How the domain name “nba.com.tw” causes confusion with the facilities or activities
of the business of the trademark owner is not well-explained in the court decision.
Following the rationale of the NBA court, the trademark owner of NBA almost
monopolized the three-letter word, “NBA,” meaning nobody else would be able to use
it in the course of other business.214 It seems that Article 20, section 1(2) of the Fair
Trade Act provides stronger protection than the anti-dilution clause of Article 62,
section 1 in the Trademark Law.
In the Decathlon case,215 the Supreme Court of Taiwan stated that:
The appellant registered the domain name “decathlon.com.tw” which
incorporated the dominant part of the appellee’s name, and nothing to do
with the appellant, while “Decathlon” was already the dominant part of
appellee’s name, and was used as trademark and service mark, commonly
known to the relevant enterprises or consumers. Thus, the registration of
the domain name that incorporated the appellee’s name could cause the
confusion to the business or service provided by the appellee with the name
of “Decathlon”. This is not allowed [by the Fair Trade Act, Article 20,
section 1(2)].216
Again, the use of the dominant word of a famous trademark seems to
automatically cause confusion to the relevant enterprises or consumers, no matter
what kind of business is done with the domain name. Literally, Article 20, section
1(2) of the Fair Trade Act requires “actual confusion” as an element, not merely
“likely to cause confusion.”217 The standard should be higher than for trademark
infringement because what is protected here is not a registered trademark, but an
unregistered business identifier. However, given the application of law above, we
find that the court jumped over the issues of actual confusion, the likelihood of
confusion, and even dilution, but reached a conclusion as to the likelihood of
dilution. 218 Evidence of confusion was hardly considered in the reasoning of the
Id. (translation by Author).
See generally id.
215 Zhangji Corp. v. Decathlon S.A., 2008 Taishang Tzi No. 1275 (Taiwan Sup. Ct. June 19,
2008).
216 Id. (translation by Author).
217 Fair Trade Act, supra note 159, art. 20.
218 See Zhangji Corp. v. Decathlon S.A., 2008 Taishang Tzi No. 1275 (Taiwan Sup. Ct. June 19,
2008).
213
214
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decision. Apparently, the factual evidence was not really important, and the element
of confusion was a question of law rather than a question of fact, at least when a
famous trademark was involved. Such application may be correct in some cases, but
may be incorrect in others. Rights in a famous trademark should not extend beyond
its intended goods or services, monopolizing the name in every market.
B. What Domain Name Registrants Can Rely on For a Defense
Neither the New nor Old Taiwanese trademark laws provide a domain name
registrant, who loses under a registry or registrar policy, with an RDNH declaration
or a civil action. The domain name registrant likely can only rely on general tort law
to file a civil action against an abusive trademark owner. However, research has not
uncovered any such case.
Another way for the domain name registrant to claim his or her right in a
domain name is to file a declaratory action against the trademark owner. 219 In the
cases of googlemap.com.tw, icrtmall.com.tw, skii.com.tw, vitamix.com.tw, and
bosch.com.tw, each registrant did so, but none won their cases. 220 Taiwan must
import the concept of RDNH in order to balance the trademark/domain name
protection war.
VI. COMPARATIVE STUDY
A. Comparison of U.S. Law with the UDRP
1. Elemental Comparison
Although trademark infringement and dilution may continue to be viable legal
tools for trademark owners even after the enactment of the ACPA, 221 the ACPA is
still the main legal device for trademark owners to fight cybersquatters. Thus, only
the elements of ACPA and UDRP are compared here.

219 See, e.g., Wisdom United Digital Asset Mgmt Corp. v. Google Corp, 2008 Zhi Tzi No. 18
(Taipei Dist. Ct. Nov. 6, 2008).
220 See Wisdom United Digital Asset Mgmt Corp. v. Google Corp, 2008 Zhi Tzi No. 18 (Taipei
Dist. Ct. Nov. 6, 2008); Senqui Int’l, Inc. v. Taipei Int’l Cmty. Cultural Found., 2007 Zhi Tzi No. 81
(Taipei Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2008); Holy Power Bus. Mgmt. Consulting Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Corp.,
2007 Zhi Tzi No. 81 (Taipei Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2008); Taiwan Network Info. Ctr. v. Vita-Max Corp.,
2002 Su Tzi No. 3223 (Taipei Dist. Ct. Oct. 30, 2002); Bosch Corp. v. Robert Bosch, 2002 Su Tzi No.
91 (Taipei Dist. Ct. Mar. 27, 2003).
221 See, e.g., Passport Health, Inc. v. Travel Med, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01753-GEB-JFM, 2011 WL
590723, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011) (granting injunction to trademark owner against domain
name registrant’s confusingly similar domain name).
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Neither the ACPA nor the UDRP requires “commercial use” of a mark,222 while
both require that the domain name be identical or confusingly similar to the
trademark.223 At the same time, they have the following differences:
1. While the ACPA protects only famous or distinctive trademarks,224 the
UDRP has no such limitation.225
2. While a trademark owner is required under the UDRP to prove that the
domain name registrant has no rights or legitimate interest with respect to
the domain name,226 the trademark owner has no such burden under the
ACPA.227
3. While the ACPA requires that a domain name registrant have a bad faith
intent to profit from the mark, as well as register, traffic in, or use a domain
name,228 the UDRP requires that the domain name registrant register and
use the domain name in bad faith.229
2. Process of Interest Balancing
If we reviewed the actual application and practice of the ACPA and the UDRP,
we would find that the ACPA and UDRP are somewhat different from one another.
For example, as discussed above, the UDRP requires both registration and use of a
domain name in bad faith, but the UDRP panels developed the “inaction doctrine,”
which can establish bad faith use even if there is no active use.230 Such practice
loosens the “registration and use” requirement under the UDRP and brings it closer
to the “register, traffic[] in or use[]” requirement under the ACPA, which requires
that only one of the elements be present. Moreover, in any case under the ACPA
where a person believed, and had a reasonable basis for that belief, that the use of
the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful, it should not amount to bad
faith.231 This makes the ACPA, like the UDRP, look to whether the domain name
registrant has a right to or legitimate interest in the domain name. Thus, if we
compare the ACPA to the UDRP, we find a very similar framework for addressing
222 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 7A.06[1][c][iv] (2012) (noting that
certain noncommercial uses of a trademark may rise to the level of bad faith required for ACPA
claims); see also id. § 7A.06[2][a] (listing requirements necessary to invoke mandatory
administrative proceeding).
223 Id. §§ 7A.06[1], [2][a].
224 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(a)(ii) (2012).
225 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
226 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
227 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I) (stating that one factor of determining “whether a person has
a bad faith intent” is what “trademark or other intellectual property right [the registrant has], if
any, in the domain name”).
228 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
229 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
230 Supra Part IV.A.2.
231 15 U.S.C § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
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the trademark and domain name conflict. And, this is what this Article would like to
advocate: In judging the trademark/domain name protection war, nothing is clearcut, and requires a process of interest balancing based on a number of factors. This
proposition can be further supported through a comparison of the bad faith factors
under the ACPA and the circumstances or evidence required to prove “bad faith” and
a “right or legitimate interest” under the UDRP.
From Table 1 below, we see that many factors considered in the ACPA for
determining bad faith find a counterpart in the UDRP 4(b), which are the
requirements for proving bad faith, or in the UDRP 4(c), which are the circumstances
necessary in order to demonstrate the rights or legitimate interests of the domain
name registrant. Though some do not really match, none are exclusive, and
therefore, could be taken into consideration in determining the others.232
Table 1: Comparison of factors for bad faith under ACPA and UDRP
Factors considered in the ACPA

Counterpart in the UDRP

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)

UDRP ¶ 4

(I) the trademark or other intellectual
property rights of the person, if any, in
the domain name

(c)(i) before any notice to [the registrant]
of the dispute, [the registrant’s] use of, or
demonstrable preparations to use, the
domain name or a name corresponding to
the domain name in connection with a
bona fide offering of goods or services;
(c)(ii) [the registrant] (as an individual,
business, or other organization) ha[s]
been commonly known by the domain
name, even if [the registrant] ha[s]
acquired no trademark or service mark
rights

(II) the extent to which the domain name
consists of the legal name of the person
or a name that is otherwise commonly
used to identify that person

232 Both the ACPA and UDRP indicate that their factors are not limited.
See 15 U.S.C.
1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2012); UDRP, supra note 101, ¶¶ 4(b), 4(c). In Sportys.com, the court held that a
domain name, which incorporated the mark of the trademark owner, was registered primarily to
prevent the trademark owner from using it, and therefore, constituted “bad faith intent.” Sporty’s
Farm LLC v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 499 (2d Cir. 2000). The factual circumstances
considered by the Sportys court are akin to those listed in the UDRP 4(b)(ii).
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(III) the person’s prior use, if any, of the
domain name in connection with the
bona fide offering of any goods or services
(IV) the person’s bona fide
noncommercial or fair use of the mark in
a site accessible under the domain name

(c)(iii) [the registrant is] making a
legitimate noncommercial or fair use of
the domain name, without intent for
commercial gain to misleadingly divert
consumers or to tarnish the trademark
or service mark at issue

(V) the person’s intent to divert
consumers from the mark owner’s online
location to a site accessible under the
domain name that could harm the
goodwill represented by the mark, either
for commercial gain or with the intent to
tarnish or disparage the mark, by
creating a likelihood of confusion as to
the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of the site

(b)(iv) by using the domain name, [the
registrant] ha[s] intentionally attempted
to attract, for commercial gain, Internet
users to [the registrant’s] web site or
other on-line location, by creating a
likelihood of confusion with the
complainant’s mark as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement
of [the registrant’s] web site or location
or of a product or service on [the
registrant’s] web site or location

(VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or
otherwise assign the domain name to the
mark owner or any third party for
financial gain without having used, or
having an intent to use, the domain
name in the bona fide offering of any
goods or services, or the person’s prior
conduct indicating a pattern of such
conduct

(b)(i) circumstances indicating that [the
registrant] ha[s] registered or ha[s]
acquired the domain name primarily for
the purpose of selling, renting, or
otherwise transferring the domain name
registration to the complainant who is
the owner of the trademark or service
mark or to a competitor of that
complainant, for valuable consideration
in excess of your documented out-ofpocket costs directly related to the
domain name

(VII) the person’s provision of material
and misleading false contact information
when applying for the registration of the
domain name, the person’s intentional
failure to maintain accurate contact
information, or the person’s prior conduct
indicating a pattern of such conduct
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(VIII) the person’s registration or
acquisition of multiple domain names
which the person knows are identical or
confusingly similar to marks of others
that are distinctive at the time of
registration of such domain names, or
dilutive of famous marks of others that
are famous at the time of registration of
such domain names, without regard to
the goods or services of the parties
(IX) the extent to which the mark
incorporated in the person’s domain
name registration is or is not distinctive
and famous within the meaning of the
[TDRA]
(b)(ii) [the registrant] ha[s] registered
the domain name in order to prevent the
owner of the trademark or service mark
from reflecting the mark in a
corresponding domain name, provided
that [the registrant] ha[s] engaged in a
pattern of such conduct
(b)(iii) [the registrant] ha[s] registered
the domain name primarily for the
purpose of disrupting the business of a
competitor

3. Similar Developments on Personal Name Protection
In addition to protecting personal names as a trademark, the ACPA provides
limited protection for an individual’s name against cyberpiracy:
Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of
another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar
thereto, without that person’s consent, with the specific intent to profit from
such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to that person or
any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person.233

233 Title III of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, Appendix I, § 3002(b)(1)(A), 113 Stat. 1501A-521, 1501A-548 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 8131(1)(A) (2012)).
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This protection, which is less than traditional trademark protection, does not
extend to all bad faith registrations, but instead is limited to registering domain
names with the intent to profit from the personal name. In order to develop a more
comprehensive protection of personal names, the ACPA § 3006(a) directed “the
Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Patent and Trademark Office and
the Federal Election Commission, [to] conduct a study and report to Congress with
recommendations on guidelines and procedures for resolving disputes involving,”
among other things, personal names.234 The report of the Secretary of Commerce
concluded that:
[T]he time is not ripe for further Federal legislation to protect personal
names from abusive registration as domain names. In the political area, we
see no need at this time for the FEC to intervene to create a centralized
accurate list of official candidates and potential candidates for Federal,
State or local offices. With regard to existing remedies available under
trademark law, unfair competition, and dilution, we observe that aggrieved
personal name holders are eligible for protection under these laws.
Further, the ACPA provides relief from the misuse of personal names as
domain names when any person registers a domain name that consists of
the name of another person, or a name substantially and confusingly
similar thereto, without that person’s consent, with specific intent to profit
from such a name by selling the domain name for financial gain. Finally,
the Department of Commerce believes that WIPO’s ongoing process to study
and consider issues arising from bad faith registration of personal names
will hold particular value in further informing current discussions on these
complicated issues and holds promise to result in the development of
globally functional recommendations regarding the resolution of related
disputes.235
The U.S. Department of Commerce apparently thought that the United States
did not need to extend its protection of personal names to abusive registrations of
domain names, and expected WIPO to resolve the complicated issue involving
comprehensive disputes between domain names and personal names. 236 WIPO
commenced the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process on July 10, 2000.237 A
final report was published on September 3, 2001, after a process of consultations and
online and in-person regional meetings. 238 The final report made “practical
recommendations based on the consultation process, and was presented to WIPO‘s
Member States and the Internet community, including ICANN.”239 To accommodate
Id. § 3006(a), 113 Stat. at 1501A-550.
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: THE
ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1999, SECTION 3006 CONCERNING THE
ABUSIVE REGISTRATION OF DOMAIN NAMES 12 (2001).
236 See Id.
237 WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc
/en/processes/process2/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
238 Id.
239 Id.
234
235
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broader protection for personal names, the final report recommended against
modifying the UDRP.240 The main reason for this recommendation was the “lack of
an international norm for protecting personal names and the consequent diversity of
legal approaches deployed to protect personal names at the national level.”241 WIPO
believed that “this diversity would place parties and panelists in an international
procedure in an untenable position and would jeopardize the credibility and efficiency
of the UDRP.”242
B. Comparison of U.S. Law and Taiwanese Law
For a more clear comparison of U.S. Law and Taiwanese Law, the following
table provides a synopsis of trademark infringement, unfair competition, antidilution, anti-cybersquatting, and foreign well-known trademark infringement under
U.S law and Taiwanese law, including the Old Law, New Law and Fair Trade Act,
which were discussed in Part V.
Table 2: Comparison of U.S. Law and Taiwanese Law Regarding Trademark and
Domain Name Protection
Legal Device /
Compared Law

U.S. Law

Old Law

New Law

Trademark
Infringement

Lanham Act § 32,
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)

Article 61
§§ 1, 2

Article 68

Unfair Competition

Lanham Act § 32(a),
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)

Article 62(2) &
Fair Trade Act
Article 20 §§ 1, 2

Fair Trade Act
Article 20
§§ 1(1), (2)

Anti-Dilution

Lanham Act § 32(c),
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)

Article 62(1)

Article 69(1), (2)

AntiCybersquatting

Lanham Act § 32(d)(1),
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)

None

None

Foreign WellKnown Trademark
Infringement

None

Fair Trade Act
Article 20 § 1(3)

Fair Trade Act
Article 20 § 1(3)

240 REPORT OF THE SECOND WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS, THE RECOGNITION OF
RIGHTS AND THE USE OF NAMES IN THE INTERNET DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM 86 (2001), available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs/report-final2.pdf.
241 Id.
242 Id. There has been no further development to protect personal names from cyberpiracy,
whether in the U.S. law or the UDRP. There are, however, a handful of cases arising out of the
ACPA, 15 U.S.C. § 8131, after its enactment. See, e.g., Bogoni v. Gomez, 847 F. Supp. 2d 519
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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From the table above, we see that there is no anti-cybersquatting legislation in
Taiwan. Taiwanese law takes advantage of constructive infringement, namely, antidilution, and unfair competition to address cybersquatters, even under the New Law.
However, this is a poor fit.243 If the cybersquatting involves neither competition nor
a famous trademark, the anti-dilution and unfair competition laws may or may not
apply.
Moreover, in order to deal with cybersquatters, the Taiwanese courts seem to
unduly expand the scope of the anti-dilution and unfair competition laws, as
discussed above.244 The court’s interpretation of anti-dilution is under Article 62(1)
in the Old Law, which requires “diluting the distinctiveness or reputation of
the . . . well-known trademark.”245 It is the counterpart to the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act (“FTDA”),246 which was in force until the enactment of the TDRA. The
FTDA had the same requirements as Article 62(1) in the Old Law. 247 The U.S.
Supreme Court held that the FTDA “unambiguously require[d] a showing of actual
dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution” through reliable evidence.248 “Whatever
difficulties of proof may be entailed, they are not an acceptable reason for dispensing
with proof of an essential element of a statutory violation.”249 In light of this issue,
Professor McCarthy advocated that the “theory of any kind, whether in physics,
medicine, or law, should never be applied in a real world case without some hard
evidence to support it. The extraordinary remedy of an anti-dilution law should
require evidentiary rigor by the courts.” 250 In McCarthy’s opinion, a famous
trademark owner could prove the dilution by expert testimony or survey evidence. 251
For example, an expert “could testify that the value of the mark for such purposes as
security in obtaining financing has been, or is likely to be, lessened by the presence of
accused [infringing] use in the marketplace.”252 The Taiwanese IP Court’s decisions
in the Chanel and Swarovski cases seem to quickly and easily reach a conclusion of
dilution without the demonstration of solid evidence.253 Not to mention that, in the
Fair Trade Act cases of NBA and Decathlon, where actual confusion was required,
the court found that a domain name that was identical to a trademark equaled
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 25:77.
See discussion supra Part V.A.5.b.
245 Trademark Act of 2003, supra note 158, art. 62.
246 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985, 985–86,
repealed by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730,
1730–32.
247 Compare Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 § 3, 109 Stat. at 985 (“The owner of a
famous mark shall be entitled . . . to an injunction against another person’s commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark”), with Trademark Act of 2003, supra note 158,
art. 61(1) (“Knowingly using a trademark identical or similar to a well-known registered trademark
of another person, . . . and hence diluting the distinctiveness or reputation of the said well-known
trademark”).
248 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003).
249 Id. at 434.
250 J. Thomas McCarthy, Proving a Trademark Has Been Diluted: Theories or Facts?, 41 HOUS.
L. REV. 713, 747 (2004).
251 See id. at 742–45 (explaining position on both expert testimony and survey evidence).
252 Id. at 743.
253 See discussion supra Part V.A.5.c.
243
244
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confusion. 254 The fact that registering a domain name itself is not “using” a
trademark, and that it does not automatically cause confusion, were both
disregarded. 255 Having reviewed the history of the trademark dilution and Fair
Trade Act decisions, it is strongly recommended that Taiwan enact its own
anticybersquatting law to address the cybersquatting issues through a process of
interest balancing.
C. Comparison of Taiwanese Law and the UDRP
A comparison of Taiwanese law and UDRP also supports a recommendation that
Taiwan should enact its own anticybersquatting law, which should include an RDNH
prevention mechanism. There are several reasons for this proposal.
First, both the UDRP and the ACPA of U.S. law protect a distinctive mark
against cybersquatters.256 It is not clear, however, whether Taiwanese law provides
such protection to trademark owners. This is because Taiwanese law still uses
dilution to handle the issue of cybersquatting, even in the New Law.257 Because a
distinctive trademark is the fruit of human labor, its protection is an essential
component for justice in Taiwanese intellectual property law.
Second, adjudicating the trademark/domain name protection war is a process of
balancing interests based on a variety of factual considerations. 258 Under the
consensus view of WIPO’s UDRP panels, “mere registration of a domain name, even
one that is comprised of a confirmed dictionary word or phrase (which may be generic
with respect to certain goods or services), may not of itself confer rights or legitimate
interests in the domain name.” 259 Further factual circumstances are required to
assist adjudication of such an issue. How will Taiwanese law and courts decide the
trademark/domain name protection war by involving only “dilution” in the
Trademark Law, whether under the Old or New Law, or “confusion” in the Fair
Trade Act? An additional legal device is vitally necessary for Taiwan.
Third, although the UDRP is a quick and inexpensive proceeding for trademark
and domain disputes, the UDRP itself still has several defects, such as the UDRP
being only “a summary procedure, in which each side has only one submission, and in
which there is neither testimony, cross-examination, briefing, nor argument cannot
by itself hope to make credibility determinations or sort out complex competing
claims.”260 Because the whole win-rate for the complainant may affect the business

See discussion supra Part V.A.5.d.
See discussion supra Part V.A.5.d.
256 See discussion supra Part VI.A.
257 See discussion supra Part V.A.3.
258 See discussion supra Part VI.A.2.
259 WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Second Edition (“WIPO
Overview 2.0”), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/overview
2.0/index.html#22 (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
260 See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the
APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 100 (2000).
254
255
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of a respective dispute resolution provider, UDRP panel selection bias may exist; 261
there is no appeal system to correct clear errors or to correct inconsistencies between
different panels’ decisions. 262 Thus, a national court is still necessary for a final
decision in trademark and domain name disputes. Without an anticybersquatting
law, the Taiwanese courts may misunderstand the legal effect of UDRP decisions and
may erroneously dismiss cases, much like the Yageo case discussed earlier.263
Finally, under the New Law, a registrant has no means to fight back against a
trademark owner. This stands in contrast to trademark owners’ protections against
a domain name registrant’s constructive infringement and trade identifier protection
against domain name registrants. 264 The trademark/domain name protection war
thus becomes asymmetric and imbalanced. Judging the trademark/domain name
protection war should be a process of interest balancing as advocated by this Article,
and there should be parity between the rights of trademark owners and domain
name holders. Anticybersquatting legislation is therefore necessary for Taiwan, and
should incorporate an RDNH prevention mechanism, much like U.S. law, so that
lawful domain name holders might have something with which to defend their
domain names against a powerful trademark owner.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Trademark Law is the Key to the Trademark/Domain Name Conflict
The most important concern of this Article is whether judges in both the U.S.
and Taiwan appropriately and fairly adjudicate the trademark/domain name war.
Domain names have almost all the features of property. The domain name registrant
has the exclusive right to use their domain name under the registration agreement
with the registrar. Once a registrant registers a domain name, no one else can
register that domain name until the registration expires. Domain names also have
value, as they can be traded in the marketplace. Both the Kremen and Paige courts
accepted that a domain name can be property for the purposes of conversion actions
under California law and Utah law, respectively.
Of course, there is no simple resolution to this issue. Grafting the “first
possession” doctrine for property is not a workable approach for the registration of
domain names. The “first come, first served” rule is the approach to domain name
registration, but not for judging the trademark/domain name protection war. When a
trademark conflicts with a domain name, there is no inherent legal basis for the
domain name registrant to fight against the trademark owner. Instead, it is the
261 See generally Michael Geist, Fair.com?:
An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic
Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 903, 927–28 (2002) (discussing bias within
UDRP caseload allocation).
262 See Yun Zhao, Reflection on the Finality of Panel’s Decisions in Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Process, with Reference to China’s Practice, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 395,
409 (2009) (suggesting a two-tier system that would allow for appeals from panel decisions).
263 See discussion supra Part V.A.5.a.
264 See discussion supra Part V.A.
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trademark and unfair competition laws that draw the lines for trademark and
domain name protection. Thus, the study of trademark and unfair competition laws
is important and necessary for solving the trademark/domain name conflict.
B. Interest Balancing Based on Factual Considerations
The legal mechanisms available under U.S. law for trademark/domain name
conflicts include (1) trademark infringement, (2) dilution and (3) the ACPA. The core
element of each is “likelihood of confusion,” “blurring the distinctiveness or
tarnishing the reputation,” and “bad faith intent,” respectively. Originally, the ACPA
was designed to address the trademark/domain name conflict. Through comparison
of the ACPA and the UDRP, we see that the two share similar frameworks. This
Article posits that there are no clear-cut answers when resolving the
trademark/domain name protection war. It requires a prudent process of interest
balancing based on numerous factors. Many factors contemplated by the ACPA for
determining cybersquatting mirror those contemplated by the UDRP. The ACPA and
UDRP are so similar that they have developed similar personal name protections.
C. Taiwan Should Enact its Own ACPA for Better Treatment of Trademark/Domain
Name Conflicts
Unlike U.S. law and the UDRP, Taiwanese law still relies on both constructive
infringement and the Fair Trade Act to address the issue of cybersquatting.
However, dilution requires “blurring the distinctiveness or tarnishing the
reputation,” and unfair competition requires “causing confusion” under the respective
statutes. These legal concepts sometimes lead to poor applications of the law to the
underlying facts. We saw this in chanel-pawnshop.com, swarov.com.tw, nba.com.tw,
decathlon.com.tw, where the court quickly determined that dilution or confusion
existed without any concrete evidence being demonstrated. Because there is no
appropriate mechanism of interest balancing provided in the trademark statute,
Taiwanese courts could possibly sacrifice the registrant’s interest under the free
competition rule, while stretching the dilution law and Fair Trade Act into the
trademark/domain name conflict. Moreover, the lack of an ACPA-like provision
causes the Taiwanese courts to be unfamiliar with the legal position of the UDRP or
other registry policies. Clearly, the Yageo court treated the UDRP decision as an
award of arbitration made in the United States, and held that it should have binding
effect in Taiwan, when in fact this was error. Some court decisions have wrongly
dismissed cases under the belief that there is no case or controversy between the
trademark owner and domain name registrant.
This is in addition to the
undeveloped concept of RDNH prevention. Thus, it is the recommendation of this
Article that Taiwan enact its own ACPA with an RDNH prevention device.

